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I. INTRODUCTION 
Marriage is no longer what it once was. Since the 1970's, and accel-
erating in recent decades, the link between formal marriage and fam-
ily life has weakened dramatically. Nearly one-half of U.S. adults are 
now single at any given time, and two of five children are born to 
unmarried parents.1 At the same time, delayed marriage, divorce, re-
marriage, and changing gender roles have transformed the content of 
marriage itself. 
Despite these changes, the federal income tax and the Social Secur-
ity system continue to define "family" based on formal marriage, and 
our textbooks treat the economic vulnerability of the married woman 
as the central problem of gender in tax policy design.2 In this Article, 
I argue that the growing gap between legal fiction and social reality 
undermines the ability of the tax-and-transfer system to achieve any 
of a range of objectives-whether fostering individual freedom, aiding 
the poor, or shoring up the traditional family. 
* Jacquin D. Bierman Professor in Taxation, Yale Law School. I received helpful 
comments from Michael Livingston, Rebecca Kysar, Kirk Stark, Jacob Goldin, Jake Siegel, 
and participants in the Columbia Law School Tax Policy Colloquium. I also received 
helpful comments from Deborah Schenk and other participants in the NYU/UCLA 
conference, The Tax Code at 100, held at NYU Law School on October 19, 2012. I am 
grateful to Vicki Schultz and to the students in our Spring 2012 course, Family, State, and 
Market, in which we examined the new realm of American family life. Joanna Zhang, 
Shruti Hazra, and Jonathan Choi provided first-rate research assistance. 
1 U.S. Census Bureau, America's Families and Living Arrangements: 2012, tbl.Al, http:/ 
/www.census.gov/hhes/families/data/cps2012.html (50.7% of adults were married in 2012); 
Brady E. Hamilton, Joyce A. Martin & Stephanie J. Ventura, Ctrs. for Disease Control, 
Births: Preliminary Data for 2010, National Vital Statistics Reports 4 (Nov. 17, 2011), 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr60/nvsr60_02.pdf ( 41 % of births in 2009 were to un-
married women). 
2 See, e.g., Joseph Bankman, Daniel N. Shaviro & Kirk J. Stark, Federal Income Taxa-
tion 21-24, 566-69 (17th ed. 2012); (discussing the taxation of marriage and joint filing); 
Michael J. Graetz & Deborah H. Schenk, Federal Income Taxation: Principles and Policies 
451-66 (7th ed. 2013) (discussing the taxation of marriage and divorce). In focusing on the 
situation of married women, the casebooks reflect the tenor of leading scholarship. See 
sources cited in note 23. 
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In the mid-twentieth century, the legal convention that marriage 
equals family was rooted in social practice. The overwhelming major-
ity of adults married, and their marriages shared relatively fixed and 
predictable terms: Couples married early, had children quickly, and 
adopted a gendered division of labor till death did them part.3 In soci-
ologists' terms, marriage was a social institution that transformed indi-
viduals into couples with shared lives and shared luck.4 In the mid-
twentieth century, moreover, marriage was family life: It was the pri-
mary home for sexual activity, child-bearing and -rearing, and adult 
work and identity formation. 5 In that era, income tax and transfer 
rules that treated the married couple as the basic unit of family life 
(and, indeed, social life) made sense. But recent decades of social 
change have destroyed that policy equilibrium. 
Since 1970, with a notable acceleration since 1990, three trends have 
reconfigured American family life. First, marriage is no longer the 
dominant institution for adult development or child-bearing and -rear-
ing. The growing social acceptability of nonmarriage has combined 
with delayed marriage, divorce, and a striking rise in cohabitation to 
decimate what was once the expected life pattern for adults: lifelong 
marriage. The unmarried still have children, however, and a rising 
percentage of children are born to unmarried mothers and live for a 
significant portion of their childhood in a single- or cohabiting-parent 
household.6 
Second, even among the married population, the content of mar-
riage has become heterogeneous and contested. The institution of 
marriage no longer necessarily implies shared resources, shared ex-
pectations, shared children (or any children at all), or defined roles in 
day-to-day life.7 Childless couples, blended families, late-in-life mar-
riages, and two-career couples are no longer the exception: They are 
the new norm. 8 
Third, marital behavior has become stratified by class to an unprec-
edented degree. Lasting marriage and continuous child-rearing of 
shared biological children by two parents have become more than 
3 See Andrew J. Cherlin, The Marriage-Go-Round 63-86 (2009). 
4 See, e.g., Peter Berger & Hansfried Kellner, Marriage and the Construction of Reality, 
96 Diogenes 1, 1 (1964) (describing marriage as a social institution). 
5 Of course, it would be inaccurate to claim that every individual endorsed these norms, 
inaccurate to deny class and cultural differences, and wrong to ignore the reprehensible 
legal and social exclusion of gay men and lesbians during that era. Still, in the mid-twenti-
eth century, the identification of the married couple as the basic unit of family life corre-
sponded reasonably well to the social life of many. 
6 See note 1. 
7 See Andrew J. Cherlin, The Deinstitutionalization of American Marriage, 66 J. Mar-
riage & Fam. 848, 852 (2004). 
s Id. at 853. 
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ever before the nearly-exclusive preserve of the upper class.9 Even 
these marriages, however, reflect new behavior and expectations: 
Couples marry later, often with substantial education and career expe-
rience, and engage in much less role specialization.10 
Sociologists have a succinct and dramatic way of expressing these 
changes: marriage, they say, has become "de-institutionalized."11 
Marriage today is no longer the primary and normal state for adult 
Americans: It is no longer the expected route to maturity or the ex-
clusive site for sex, romance, and child-rearing.12 Instead sociologists 
describe a new individualism in family formation and dissolution.13 
More than ever before, Americans see marriage as one among many 
options for personal growth and fulfillment, and they form and exit 
marriages along with other relationships as a normal part of the life 
course.14 
Critics worry that the new individualism in family life heralds social 
breakdown.15 Others applaud the de-institutionalization of marriage 
as social progress.16 In this Article, I neither attack nor defend the 
new individualism. Instead, I aim to demonstrate its implications for 
the design of the welfare state. To keep the analysis manageable, I 
initially focus on a central feature of the income tax: joint filing. 
Later, I consider implications of the new individualism for a second 
key component of the welfare state: the spousal benefit in Social 
Security. 
My thesis is that the new individualism has rendered obsolete legal 
doctrines and policy analyses that treat formal marriage as the proxy 
for family life. Joint filing, for example, has been the centerpiece of 
debates over the taxation of the family since the 1930's. Today, how-
ever, joint filing is no longer well-tailored to serve important social 
9 See id. at 855. 
10 See Michele Hoffnung, Wanting It All: Career, Marriage, and Motherhood During 
College-Educated Women's 20's, 50 Sex Roles 711, 711 (2001). 
11 Cherlin, note 7, at 848. 
12 Id.; cf. Hannah Bruckner & Karl Ulrich Mayer, De-Standardization of the Life 
Course: What Might it Mean? And If it Means Anything, Whether it Actually Took 
Place?, 9 Advances Life Course Res. 27, 28 (2005) (documenting the growing de-standardi-
zation of family life in Germany). 
13 See, e.g., Cherlin, note 3, at 90-103 (describing the growing role of expressive individ-
ualism in marriage). Cherlin draws on the work of Robert Bellah and others who have 
documented the rise of expressive individualism in American life generally. See id. at 28-
30; Robert N. Bellah, Richard Madsen, William M. Sullivan, Ann Swidler & Steven M. 
Tipton, Habits of the Heart (1985). 
14 Cherlin, note 7, at 853. 
15 See, e.g., Charles Murray, Coming Apart (2012). 
16 See, e.g., Claudia Card, Against Marriage and Motherhood, 11 Hypatia 1, 5 (1996). 
Card's article is staking out a normative position rather than reacting to data on the de-
institutionalization of marriage. The thrust of her argument is to reject many of the norms 
of traditional marriage and motherhood. 
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objectives, and this point holds whether one endorses the new individ-
ualism or, like many social conservatives, deplore it. Similarly, the 
spousal benefit in Social Security once addressed the central gender 
injustice of U.S. society, the economic vulnerability of housewives. 
Today, however, the spousal benefit no longer protects the most vul-
nerable citizens, or even the most vulnerable women, once we look 
past current retirees to future cohorts. 
The obsolescence of formal marriage as a legal category extends to 
conventional policy equations. Consider the so-called "trilemma," 
which most casebooks and law teachers use to structure classes on the 
taxation of the family. The trilemma holds that an income tax cannot 
simultaneously maintain progressive marginal rates, impose equal 
taxes on equal-earning couples, and insist on marriage neutrality.17 In 
recent decades, some casebooks have added the feminist point that 
joint filing tends to perpetuate a traditional division of labor by penal-
izing two-worker couples and imposing a high marginal tax rate on 
working wives. is 
But both the trilemma and the feminist critique assume, implicitly, 
that family life occurs (mostly) within marriage and that the economic 
vulnerability of the homemaker wife is a major social problem. Once 
we recognize that marriage is no longer the organizing institution for 
work and family life, and once we understand that marriage has be-
come heterogeneous, the principle of "equal taxation of equal-earning 
married couples" no longer packs the same normative punch. Simi-
larly, once we recognize that gender equality in married couples has 
increased, that most wives work outside the home, and that single 
mothers bear the greatest burden of gendered roles, the most vulnera-
ble player is no longer the nonworking wife but the working (but low-
earning) single mother. 
Much like joint filing, the spousal benefit in Social Security tracks a 
social reality that no longer exists. The spousal benefit, along with 
other provisions, protects wives in traditional marriages when hus-
bands/breadwinners retire, die, or become disabled. At the same 
time, the spousal benefit, combined with the payroll tax, penalizes 
working wives and rewards traditional gender roles. But the framing 
of the social problem has gone askew here as well. Two-earner mar-
riages are the norm rather than the exception. And while women to-
day are economically vulnerable by virtue of their lower wages and 
care responsibilities, they are often divorced or never-married single 
mothers rather than widows or dependent wives. 
11 See Graetz & Schenk, note 2, at 451-52; see also Lawrence Zelenak, Marriage and the 
Income Tax, 67 S. Cal. L. Rev. 339, 342 (1994). 
is See Graetz & Schenk, note 2, at 453. 
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It may seem that I overstate the case when I claim that even social 
conservatives should abandon joint filing and the spousal benefit. 
Surely those who valorize marriage should insist on linking income 
taxation and Social Security to formal marriage-precisely in order to 
reward the (shrinking) group of the formally-married! But, in fact, 
neither joint filing nor the spousal benefit is well-designed to reward 
marriage or to combat the de-institutionalization of marriage. Social 
conservatives, I suggest, should instead advocate effective pro-mar-
riage policies that would replace today's ad hoc pattern of rewards 
and penalties with incentives tailored to desired behaviors. While the 
social conservative agenda is not one that I endorse, I consider it in 
order to show how badly outdated joint filing is-by any lights. 
My thesis implies that the income tax and Social Security both stand 
in need of major reform. The proper legal response to the new indi-
vidualism varies, of course, depending on one's view of the ideals that 
motivate the income tax and the Social Security system. Liberal indi-
vidualism militates in favor of individual filing in the income tax and 
individual benefits, with optional joint-and-survivor annuities, in So-
cial Security. By contrast, welfarist traditions endorse the aggregation 
of income at the household level in order to measure well-being. 
What is notable is that the new contours of family life render some 
policies (notably, individual filing) more administratively feasible, 
while rendering other policies difficult but critically important (nota-
bly, the identification of household members). 
The new social context also creates new options for the welfare 
state: Once we recognize that joint filing is obsolete, we can see more 
clearly the range of possibilities for tailoring taxes and benefits to re-
ward certain family configurations or capture some of the economic 
rents to unearned privilege. Today, it is primarily the denizens of the 
upper- and upper-middle classes who marry, remain married, and rear 
joint children within marriage.19 The causes of the class correlation 
are hotly debated: Does marriage make people richer, or do richer 
people have the wherewithal to stay married? But the fact of the cor-
relation raises the possibility of raising taxes or lowering benefits 
based on marital status, and particularly marital longevity. 
I do not suppose that mainstream politicians will endorse a mar-
riage tax any time soon, and I note empirical and administrative draw-
backs to the idea. Still, it is worth pausing to see the intellectual 
merits of the proposal. Welfarists have long endorsed ability taxation, 
which imposes a nondistorting but redistributive tax on high-ability 
19 See Andrew J. Cherlin, Demographic Trends in the United States: A Review of Re-
search in the 2000s, 72 J. Marriage & Fam. 403, 403-04 (2010). 
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individuals.20 Liberals have championed taxes on undeserved social 
privilege.21 Marriage today is arguably a marker or "tag" for both 
ability (meaning eventual high earnings) and social privilege. Analyti-
cally, if not politically, a marriage tax may be worth adding to our 
repertoire of policy options in the age of the new individualism. 
This Article owes much to two strands of the scholarly literature. 
First, a number of scholars in taxation and family law have questioned 
the law's reliance on outdated categories, including formal marriage 
and the nuclear family.22 This Article, too, calls for the law to take 
notice of the new realities of family life. Second, although this Article 
aims to update the social context for feminist reform, it remains a fem-
inist project, and it builds on a conversation bravely begun and 
thoughtfully continued over the years by tax scholars including Grace 
Ganz Blumberg, Lawrence Zelenak, Marjorie Kornhauser, Pamela 
Gann, and Edward McCaffery.23 My work here extends their view 
that the income tax and Social Security should pay attention to social 
reality. 
20 See Louis Kaplow, The Theory of Taxation and Public Economics 54-57 (2010). 
21 Bruce Ackerman & Anne Alstott, The Stakeholder Society 94-112, 155-77 
(1999)(proposing taxes on wealth and childhood social privilege); Philippe Van Parijs, Real 
Freedom for All: What (If Anything) Can Justify Capitalism? 102-18 (1997)(proposing 
taxes on inheritance and rents from jobs). 
22 See, e.g., Marriage at the Crossroads (Marsha Garrison & Elizabeth S. Scott eds., 
2012); Katharine K. Baker, Homogenous Rules for Heterogeneous Families: The Stand-
ardization of Family Law When There Is No Standard Family, 2012 U. Ill. L. Rev. 319 
(arguing that the standardization of family law has administrative and privacy virtues, de-
spite its misapprehension of the realities of family life); Patricia A. Cain, Taxing Families 
Fairly, 48 Santa Clara L. Rev. 805 (2008) (analyzing options for the taxation of same-sex 
couples); Anthony C. Infanti, Decentralizing Family: An Inclusive Proposal for Individual 
Tax Filing in the United States, 2010 Utah L. Rev. 605 (advocating individual filing in order 
to capture the diversity of economically interdependent relationships); Marjorie Korn-
hauser, Love, Money, and the IRS: Family, Income-Sharing, and the Joint Income Tax 
Return, 45 Hastings L.J. 63 (1993) (pointing out the obsolescence of the one-earner, heter-
osexual couple as the primary model of family). 
23 See, e.g., Edward J. McCaffery, Taxing Women (1999)(discussing biases in the Code 
affecting women); Alicia H. Munnell & Laura E. Stiglin, Women and a Two-Tier Social 
Security System, in A Challenge to Social Security: The Changing Roles of Women and 
Men in American Society 101 (Richard V. Burkhauser & Karen C. Holden eds., 1982); 
Grace Blumberg, Sexism in the Code: A Comparative Study of Income Taxation of Work-
ing Wives and Mothers, 21 Buff. L. Rev. 49 (1971) (pointing out the gendered impact of the 
joint return); Pamela B. Gann, Abandoning Marital Status as a Factor in Allocating In-
come Tax Burdens, 59 Tex. L. Rev. 1 (1980) (advocating individual filing on equity and 
efficiency grounds); Zelenak, note 17 (criticizing "the uneasy case" for joint returns and 
proposing individual filing); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Theory Versus Reality: The Partner-
ship Model of Marriage in Family and Income Tax Law, 69 Temp. L. Rev. 1413 (1996) 
(documenting the inequality of intrahousehold resource allocations and the lack of unity of 
interests). 
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Sociologists have noted that the mid-twentieth century marked an 
unusual period in the history of marriage. In that era-in contrast to 
earlier and later periods-couples married young, had children soon 
after marriage, and remained married, typically for life. Marriage in 
this period marked the dominant mode of adult life, and it had a rela-
tively homogeneous content for most of its participants, regardless of 
their religion or socioeconomic class. 24 
The mid-twentieth-century marriage constituted what sociologists 
term an institution: Marriage defined social roles, social status, self-
perceptions, and daily occupations for a wide swath of American 
adults. Peter Berger and Hansfried Kellner's classic 1964 study 
pointed out that married people did not simply share a demographic 
label: They truly were different from unmarried individuals.25 Con-
sider two defining features of this mid-twentieth-century institution. 
First, marriage marked the dominant pattern of adult life across a 
variety of demographic categories: Whatever one's age, race, social 
class, or economic class, one expected to marry young and stay 
married.26 
Second, the content of marriage was (by modern standards) homo-
geneous across different groups. Couples married early in life27 and 
stayed married for a lifetime. Divorce was not unknown, but it was 
uncommon until the 1970's.28 Married couples tended to divide labor 
along traditional gender lines, with wives leaving the workforce to 
care for children and the home. 29 Marriages in this era also shared 
psychological and social features. In Berger and Kellner's classic 
description, husbands and wives in essence grew up together, filtering 
the experiences of life from young adulthood on through a shared 
perspective. 30 
24 Cherlin, for example, describes the rise of companionate marriage between 1900 and 
1960: "Although husbands and wives in the companionate marriage usually adhered to a 
sharp division of labor, they were supposed to be each other's companions-friends, lov-
ers-to an extent not imagined by the spouses in the institutional marriages of the previous 
era." Cherlin, note 7, at 851; see also Berger & Kellner, note 4, at 5 (discussing the social 
construction of the concept of marriage). 
25 Berger & Kellner, note 4, at 5. 
26 Cherlin, note 3, at 63-86. 
21 U.S. Census Bureau, Estimated Median Age at First Marriage tbl.MS-2 (Sept. 21, 
2006), http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/hh-fam/ms2.pdf. 
28 U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2012, at 65 tbl.78, http:// 
www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0078.pdf (last visited Aug. 6, 2013). 
29 Cherlin, note 3, at 80-85. 
30 Berger & Kellner, note 4, at 11 ("[F]rom the beginning of the marriage each partner 
has new modes in his meaningful experience of the world in general, of other people, and 
of himself."). 
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Mid-twentieth-century marriage had its critics, including many fem-
inists, who castigated the gendered division of labor and the lifelong 
consignment of women to the home.31 But, from a policymaker's per-
spective, mid-twentieth-century marriage was a gift. Both the tax sys-
tem and Social Security aim to measure the well-being of individuals: 
The income tax aims to tax the relatively well-off, while Social Secur-
ity attempts to cushion the situation of the unfortunate. In the mid-
twentieth-century United States, marriage was so prevalent and so ho-
mogeneous that it offered a convenient and relatively sound metric 
for judging the extent of individuals' ties to others. One simple, for-
mal status determination-married or unmarried-solved some 
thorny problems for both the income tax and the Social Security 
system. 
A. The Federal Income Tax and the Joint Return 
Begin with the federal income tax. Policymakers must take notice 
of family relationships if they intend to impose progressive taxation 
based on well-being or access to resources. Consider an individual 
with zero income. He might be truly destitute. But if he has a tight-
knit, wealthy family that provides him with ample resources, he is not 
poor in a meaningful sense. 
Indeed, an income tax that does not take notice of family ties is 
vulnerable to abuse. A high-earning man, for instance, might draw up 
contracts showing that he has transferred his income to others, with 
the result that he seems to have only a modest income left to tax. But 
suppose the transferees are his wife of fifty years and his twelve chil-
dren and grandchildren, and the "transferred" funds remain under his 
sole control. In that case, the tax law should view the purported trans-
fers with a skeptical eye, because they do not meaningfully alter the 
wealthy man's well-being and control over economic resources. 
The federal income tax enacted in 1913 adopted individual filing. 
Each individual paid income taxes on his or her own income, without 
regard to family relationships.32 By 1948, however, a series of mile-
stone cases had revealed the weaknesses of individual filing in the era 
of mid-twentieth-century marriage. 
31 See, e.g., Betty Friedan, The Feminine Mystique (1963) (arguing that the gendered 
division of labor excluded women from productive life and denied them the ability to real-
ize their talents). 
32 Starting in 1918, married couples were permitted to file joint returns, but because 
there was no separate rate schedule for such joint filings, it was usually disadvantageous. 
The Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-254, § 223, 40 Stat. 1057, 1074; see Boris I. Bitt-
ker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 1389, 1400 (1975). 
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Between 1913 and 1948, the federal income tax transformed from a 
small tax on the very wealthy to a mass tax imposing high and progres-
sive tax rates.33 In this era, many wealthy married men owed a consid-
erable tax bill. It did not take long for taxpayers to figure out that if a 
man earning, say, $10,000, could split that income with his wife, they 
could reduce the total tax bill. With steeply progressive rates, taxes on 
two incomes of $5000 were lower than on one income of $10,000. "In-
come-splitting" of this type became an attractive tax shelter for many 
married couples at mid-century.34 
The middle- and upper-class push for income-splitting reflected cul-
tural conditions as well as legal design. Most women had little income 
of their own: They married young, had children early, and worked 
primarily in the home thereafter.35 Marriage typically lasted for life, 
and couples expected to share in their good or bad fortune together, 
making it irrelevant, in practical terms, whether the couple called it 
"his money" or "her money." Thus, the stage was set for income-
splitting as a device that would reduce taxes for a wide swath of 
American families. 
The first major attempt at income-splitting, Lucas v. Earl, ended in 
a victory for the IRS but a short-lived one.36 Mr. and Mrs. Earl signed 
a contract, presumptively valid under California law, that split be-
tween them all property acquired by either during the marriage. Jus-
tice Holmes, writing for the majority, declined to recognize the effects 
of the contract for federal income tax purposes. He opined that a 
salary should be taxed to the earner and that taxpayers should not be 
able to escape taxation py "anticipatory arrangements and contracts 
however skillful devised . . . . "37 
But the tax system could not extend the line drawn in Earl to pre-
vent the shifting of unearned income (income from property). Salary 
and other income from services can typically be traced to the efforts 
of an identifiable individual. By contrast, income from property fol-
lows ownership of the property. Thus, any married couple (or any 
other pair of taxpayers) wishing to shift property income had only to 
shift property ownership. A complicated jurisprudence evolved in the 
1930's, beginning with Earl and extending to later cases like Blair v. 
33 Tax rates skyrocketed during World War I and remained high, by historic standards, 
throughout the 1920's and into the 1930's. See Anne Alstott & Ben Novick, War, Taxes, 
and Income Redistribution in the Twenties: The 1924 Veterans' Bonus and the Defeat of 
the Mellon Plan, 59 Tax L. Rev. 373 (2006). 
34 Carolyn C. Jones, Split Income and Separate Spheres: Tax Law and Gender Roles in 
the 1940s, 6 Law & Hist. Rev. 259, 259 (1988). 
35 See Cherlin, note 3, at 67-72. 
36 Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930). 
37 Id. at 115. 
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Commissioner38 and Helvering v. Horst. 39 But while these cases ruled 
out efforts to transfer income without property, the tax system had no 
defense against married couples when husbands were willing to make 
outright legal transfers of property to their wives. 
State law also assisted married couples seeking to split income. Just 
months after Lucas v. Earl, the Supreme Court held that the federal 
income tax would respect income-splitting accomplished by state com-
munity property laws.40 Under Poe v. Seaborn, married individuals in 
community-property states reported half of marital income as their 
own, thus achieving in effect the income split denied to the Earls. 
Poe unleashed a wave of legislation, as states vied to respond to the 
political popularity of income-splitting. The dynamics of mid-twenti-
eth-century marriage likely bolstered this trend. Community property 
laws typically did not alter the husband's control over property during 
the marriage but did accord significant property rights to the wife in 
the event of divorce. Still, in an era when divorce seemed remote, the 
property innovation worked by community property probably seemed 
minimally intrusive, and it produced notable tax savings. A number of 
states enacted elective community-property laws, preserving the op-
tion of common-law property regimes for those preferring them. In 
1944, the Supreme Court denied income-splitting to couples in such 
states in Commissioner v. Harmon. 41 Still, that decision "slowed but 
did not halt" the search for income-splitting options.42 
In 1948, Congress solved the problem by extending income-splitting 
to couples in all states.43 The vehicle for income-splitting was the joint 
rate schedule, which adopted tax brackets for married couples filing 
jointly that were twice as wide as those for single individuals. The new 
joint filing system equalized the tax burden on married couples with 
equal incomes: Under the new regime, a couple with $10,000 of total 
income would owe the same tax, regardless of how the income was 
divided between spouses and whether the couple lived in a community 
property state. The 1948 move to joint returns with income-splitting 
also forestalled intramarital income and asset transfers: Spouses no 
longer could reduce their taxes via formal title transfers. 
The prevalence of mid-twentieth-century marriage made joint filing 
with income-splitting politically attractive. Couples in community 
property states suffered no tax increase, and couples in common law 
states often received a tax cut, thanks to the gendered division of la-
38 Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937). 
39 Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940). 
40 Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 117-18 (1930). 
41 Commissioner v. Harmon, 323 U.S. 44, 48-49 (1944). 
42 See Druker v. Commissioner, 697 F.2d 46, 48 (1982). 
43 Revenue Act of 1948, § 301, Pub. L. No. 80-471, 62 Stat. 110, 114. 
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bor. And the prevalence of marriage among the adult population cre-
ated a large constituency for income-splitting. In that era, most adults 
were married or saw themselves as likely to marry, leaving very few 
long-term single adults to object to the new marriage bonus. 
But the near-universal popularity of income-splitting was not to 
last. By 1969, the first inklings of demographic change had appeared: 
The divorce rate and age at first marriage began to climb upward, and 
wives began to enter the workplace in record numbers.44 Feeling the 
political winds shift, Congress reacted to complaints that income-split-
ting favored the married couple over the single man· by adjusting the 
rate schedules so that the marginal-rate brackets for married couples 
were no longer twice as wide as those for single taxpayers.45 
The unmarried were appeased, but at a cost. The 1969 legislation 
created the first "marriage penalty" for some couples. The 1969 com-
promise persists to this day: Husbands and wives with divergent earn-
ings still claim a marriage bonus, but two-earner couples with similar 
earnings pay a marriage penalty. 
The marriage penalty/bonus problem is, of course, insoluble. The 
well-known "trilemma" holds that an income tax cannot simultane-
ously impose progressive marginal tax rates, assess equal taxes on 
married couples with equal earnings, and maintain marriage neutrality 
(so that the total income taxes paid by two unmarried individuals 
neither increase nor decrease when the couple marries).46 
Individual filing permits a progressive income tax to be marriage 
neutral but imposes unequal tax burdens on equal-earning couples. 
By contrast, income-splitting sacrifices marriage neutrality in order to 
impose progressive rates and keep tax burdens even across couples. 
The result is that any system of joint filing inevitably creates a mar-
riage bonus, a marriage penalty, or both, as our income tax has done 
since 1969. 
Feminist scholars have pointed out that joint filing with progressive 
marginal rates tends to reward traditional gender roles while penaliz-
ing two-earner couples, because the largest marriage bonuses are 
claimed by couples with one working and one nonworking spouse.47 
Compounding the gender inequity, joint filing tends to discourages 
wives' employment, because the first dollar of wives' wages is taxed at 
the (higher) marginal rate established by the husband's earnings. (Im-
portantly, this pathology of joint filing is independent of the rate 
structure adopted in 1969; it is true in any system of joint filing when, 
44 See Cherlin, note 3, at 90-97. 
45 See Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 803, 83 Stat. 487, 678-79; see also 
Druker, 697 F.2d at 48-50 (discussing 1969 provisions). 
46 See Graetz & Schenk, note 2, at 451-52. 
47 See sources cited in note 23. 
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culturally, the wife is understood to be what economists bluntly term 
the "secondary worker."48) 
In recent years, Congress has attempted to reduce marriage penal-
ties-but inevitably, thanks to the trilemma, at the price of enlarging 
marriage bonuses. The 2001 Bush tax cuts, for instance, eliminated 
the marriage penalty in the lowest tax bracket and in the standard 
deduction but created hefty marriage bonuses.49 By contrast, the 2012 
"fiscal cliff" legislation created big marriage penalties: The top tax 
bracket for married couples lies just $50,000 above the top tax bracket 
for individual filers.so 
The shortcomings of joint filing run even deeper today, due to the 
profound shifts in marriage and family behavior that have occurred 
since 1970 (and especially since 1990).51 But first, it is instructive to 
see that the treatment of marriage followed a similar path in the So-
cial Security system. 
B. The Social Security System and the Spousal Benefit 
Mid-twentieth-century marriage was also a gift to the designers of 
the Social Security system. As originally enacted in 1935,52 Social Se-
curity provided only for benefits for workers, but an amendment in 
1939 added supplementary benefits for wives and surviving widows.53 
The spousal benefit persists today. Husbands now are eligible as 
well as wives, although the great majority of claimants are women,54 
due to women's generally lower earnings and fewer years in the 
workforce. In 2011, the Social Security system paid about $761 per 
month to two million wives and husbands solely because they were (or 
had been) married to a qualifying retired worker.55 
48 For an example of the use of the term secondary workers, see, e.g., Michelle J. White, 
Sex Differences in Urban Commuting Patterns, 76 Am. Econ. Rev. 368, 370 (1986). 
49 See IRC § l(f) (eliminating marriage penalty for taxpayers in the 15% bracket), 
§ 63(c)(2)(A) (setting the standard deduction for married couples at 200% of the deduc-
tion for single taxpayers). 
50 American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, §lOl(b), 126 Stat. 2313, 
2316-17 (setting the 39.6% bracket at $450,000 for married couples and $400,000 for single 
taxpayers). 
51 See Part III. 
52 Social Security Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-271, § 210(c), 49 Stat. 620, 625. 
53 Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-379, § 201, 53 Stat. 1360, 
1364-65. 
54 Of the 2.3 million spouses of retired workers receiving benefits as spouses in 2011, 
only 63,000 were men. U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin., Annual Statistical Supplement, Old-Age, 
Survivors, and Disability Insurance tbl.5.Cl (2012), http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/stat 
comps/supplement/2012/5c.html. 
55 Id. tbl.5.Cl. 
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A spouse is eligible for a spousal benefit if she is married to a re-
tired worker entitled to a Social Security retirement benefit.56 Di-
vorced spouses are entitled to the benefit if the marriage lasted ten 
years. The spousal benefit equals 50% of the retired worker's 
benefit.57 
For example, suppose that Abner retires at age 66 and is entitled to 
an average Social Security monthly benefit of $1300.58 His wife, Betty, 
would be entitled to claim a spousal benefit equal to one-half that 
amount, or $650, even if she had never worked for wages. Spouses 
who can also claim benefits as workers, based on their own work 
records, receive the higher of their own benefit or the spousal benefit. 
Thus, if Betty's own earnings record entitled her to $800 per month, 
Social Security would pay her that amount. But if Betty's earnings 
were low enough that her benefit was below $650, she would still re-
ceive the $650 entitlement based on her marital status.59 
Spousal benefits linked to formal marriage made eminent good 
sense in the era of mid-twentieth-century marriage. The aim of Social 
Security, like most national programs of social insurance, is to protect 
workers and their dependents against major income shocks. Just as in 
the case of the income tax, Congress did not need to burden the Social 
Security Administration with making individualized determinations of 
workers' dependents. Formal marriage was both widespread and ho-
mogeneous in its gender roles, making it both easy and accurate for 
the law to identify wives as workers' principal dependents. The for-
mal rules, in that era, were functional: It was indeed wives who were 
particularly vulnerable to a husband's retirement, death, or disability. 
But the spousal benefit, like joint filing, rewards some couples at 
the expense of others. Social Security provides retirement, disability, 
and survivors' benefits, but beneficiaries must pay a payroll tax to par-
ticipate in the system. The combined tax-benefit "deal" is particularly 
good for couples with traditional gender roles: They receive 150% of 
the worker's retirement benefit after paying taxes on 100% of the hus-
56 In United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S._ (2013), the Supreme Court held unconstitu-
tional the Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419. As of September 
2013, the Social Security Administration had announced that it would award spousal bene-
fits to married couples of the same sex if they were married in a state that permits same-sex 
marriage and are domiciled in a state that recognizes same-sex marriage. Other situations 
remain uncertain pending legal interpretation of Windsor. See U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin., 
POMs Recent Change, GN00210 BASIC, at https://secure.ssa.gov/appslO/poms.nsf/lnx/ 
0200210100. 
57 U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin., Annual Statistical Supplement, Social Security (Old-Age, Sur-
vivors, and Disability Insurance) Program Description and Legislative History, http://www 
.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/supplement/2012/oasdi.html (last visited Aug. 6, 2013). 
58 The average primary insurance amount in 2011 was $1283.49. U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin., 
note 55. 
59 See U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin., note 57. 
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band's salary. By contrast, two-earner couples pay a higher price 
(taxes on two salaries) and may not, in the end, collect more than 
150% of the higher earner's retirement benefit. 
Many two-earner couples thus pay incremental taxes for no incre-
mental benefit. To see why, return to Abner and Betty. If Betty has a 
record of low wages relative to Abner's, she may well be entitled to a 
retired worker's benefit of less than 50% of Abner's benefit. In that 
case, she will take the spousal benefit. The spousal benefit raises the 
total payment to the couple (compared to their earned benefits 
alone). But the two-earner couple has paid taxes on Betty's earnings 
without, in the end, earning any incremental coverage at retirement. 
The spousal benefit also puts divorced individuals at a potential dis-
advantage. Until the late 1970's, only spouses married at least twenty 
years before divorce were entitled to spousal benefits at retirement.60 
The divorce revolution, however, created a growing pool of divorced 
women with limited earnings records who would be destitute without 
a spousal benefit. Congress responded in 1977 by lowering the mar-
riage duration to ten years.61 
Today, continuing demographic change has further challenged the 
Social Security system.62 The decline in marriage, continued high di-
vorce rates, and nonmarital child-bearing and rearing have created 
new vulnerabilities not captured by rules that presume that formally-
and long-married wives are the principal dependents whose needs 
should be served. 
III. THE DEMISE OF Mm-TWENTIETH CENTURY MARRIAGE 
The mid-twentieth-century marriage was not destined to last. In the 
late 1960's and early 1970's, the divorce rate and age at first marriage 
began to climb upward, and wives began to enter the workplace in 
unprecedented numbers.63 But the divorce revolution and the advent 
of the working wife were just the beginning of forty years of accelerat-
ing change in American family structures. In this Part, I document the 
rise of the new individualism; in Part IV, I show that these demo-
graphic changes pose fundamental policy challenges for the income 
tax and for Social Security. 
To see the stunning depth and breadth of change, it is useful to look 
at data spanning the entire period from 1970 to today. During that 
60 See Richard V. Burkhauser & Karen C. Holden, Introduction, in A Challenge to 
Social Security, note 23, at 1, 11. 
61 Id.; Social Security Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-216, § 337, 91 Stat. 1509, 
1548. 
62 See Part III. 
63 See Cherlin, note 3, at 90-97. 
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time, three major changes have transformed marriage and family life: 
the rising percentage of unmarried adults, the growing heterogeneity 
of marriage, and the tightening link between social class, on the one 
hand, and marriage and the rearing of a couple's own children, on the 
other. 
The divorce revolution of the 1970's and the influx of wives into the 
workplace initiated the first round of major changes in American fam-
ily life. But a number of striking trends in family life, notably the rise 
in cohabitation and in nonmarital births, have accelerated since 
1990.64 
A. The Growing Prevalence of Nonmarriage 
In mid-twentieth-century America, the great majority of adults 
were married or expected to be married shortly.65 The unmarried 
felt-and were-socially excluded. By contrast, many adults m 
America today are unmarried, and many are unpartnered. 
Taking a snapshot in 2009, the Census Bureau found that 33% of 
men age fifteen and older had never married, while 67% had been 
married at least once. But only 42% of men had been married just 
once and remained in that first marriage. Twenty percent of men had 
experienced at least one divorce, and 15% of men had been married 
at least twice.66 
In 2012, a scant majority (50.7%) of adult Americans (age fifteen 
and older) were married, while 49.3% were unmarried.67 The down-
64 In the discussion below, I synthesize data from a variety of secondary sources to illus-
trate several uncontroversial findings by demographers and sociologists: the decline in 
marriage, the heterogeneity of marital behavior, and the tightening link between social 
class and marriage. At times, the data I cite do not adjust for cohort effects-that is, the 
data compare, say, the percentage of people married now to the percentage married in 
1965, without adjusting for the fact that the number of people in different age groups can 
vary. In theory, the failure to adjust for cohort size could support false inferences. Imag-
ine a case in which a population in Year 1 contains 10% children, while in Year 50 it 
contains 50% children: In such a society, marriage rates per capita would fall without any 
change in norms. In the following presentation, I cite data that limit cohort effects when 
possible: For instance, I cite data on the percentage of women, aged 15-44, in different 
relationships. 
But even unadjusted data probably, if anything, understate the trends identified, because 
of the large baby boom cohort of older people engaged in relatively traditional behavior 
(compared to younger cohorts). At my request, my research assistant, Jonathan Choi, per-
formed additional analysis to see whether the trends presented here reflect cohort effects. 
He found, and I concur, that adjusting for cohort size would not materially change the data 
cited here. 
65 See Cherlin, note 3, at 63-86. 
66 U.S. Census Bureau, Number, Timing, and Duration of Marriages and Divorces: 
2009, at 16 tbl.6 (May 2011), http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubsp70-125.pdf (14.7% re-
ported marrying twice or three times). 
67 U.S. Census Bureau, note 1. 
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ward trend line is sharp: In 2010, 51 % of Americans ages 20-54 were 
married, compared to more than 80% in the 1960's.68 But the one-
year snapshot obscures the rapid historical change that led to this 
point. The era of mid-twentieth-century marriage appears quite 
clearly in Figure 1, where the percentage of currently married men 
rises and stays high between 1940 and 1980, before dropping. At the 
same time, the percentage of never-married men drops noticeably in 
the 1940-1980 period before rising again. Interestingly, the percentage 
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The decline of marriage and the rise in alternative family arrange-
ments also appears clearly in Figure 2, which shows the steep decline 
in the percentage of married-couple households. That figure also 
shows the sharp rise in what the Census Bureau calls "non-family 
households," which include single people and cohabiting couples. 
68 The 2010 figure represents the author's calculations based on U.S. Census Bureau, 
note 28, at 53 tbl.57 (2012), http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/cats/population/ 
marital_status_and_living_arrangements.html. The 1960's figure is reported in Kazuo 
Yamaguchi & Yantao Wang, Class Identification of Married Employed Women and Men in 
America, 108 Am. J. Soc. 440, 441 (2002). 
69 U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2003, Mini-Historical 
Statistics 18 tbl.HS-11, Marital Status of the Population by Sex: 1900 to 2002, http://www 
.census.gov/statab/hist/HS-11.pdf. 
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FIGURE 2 
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Figure 2 shows, the most rapid changes, in both cases, occurred be-
tween 1970 and 1980, but the decline in married-couple households 
and the increase in nonfamily households continued in the 1990's. 
One can, of course, look at the glass as half-full rather than half-
empty: A majority of adult Americans are married at any given time, 
and two-thirds of children live with married parents. But the degree 
of social change in marriage and child-rearing in the last generation is 
astonishing, and it is the rapidity of change, as much as the levels, that 
has led sociologists to view marriage as on its way to de-
institutionalization. 
Figure 3 and Table 1 document a striking decline in marriage and 
increase in cohabitation since 1982 among women ages fifteen to 
forty-four. 
10 Id. at 19 tbl.HS-12, Households by Type and Size: 1900 to 2002 (2003), http://www 
.census.gov/statab/hist/HS-12. pdf. 
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TABLE 1 
Current Relationship Status, Percent of Women 
Aged 15-4471 
First marriage 
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From 1982 to 2010, the fraction of women who reported being mar-
ried dropped ten percentage points (taking into account first and sec-
ond marriages).73 In the same period, cohabitation increased from 
3% to 11 %-an increase of nearly 400%.74 
The surge in cohabitation in recent decades has caught sociologists 
by surprise. Andrew Cherlin, for example, once "thought that, except 
among the poor, cohabitation would remain a short-term arrangement 
11 Ctr. for Disease Control & Prevention, Key Statistics from the National Survey of 
Family Growth, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nsfg/abc_list_m.htm#current (last visited May 1, 
2012). 
72 Casey E. Copen, Kimberly Daniels, Jonathan Vespa & William D. Mosher, First 
Marriages in the United States: Data from the 2006-2010 National Survey of Family 
Growth, Nat'! Health Statistics Rep. 5 fig.l (Mar. 22, 2012), available at www.cdc.gov/nchs/ 
data/nhsr/nhsr049.pdf. 
73 Ctr. for Disease Control & Prevention, note 71. 
74 Id. 
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among childless young adults who would quickly break up or 
marry."75 But Americans of all ages now cohabit, and for a range of 
reasons. 
Cohabitation has become a familiar prelude to marriage. Between 
1965 and 1974, only 10% of first marriages were preceded by cohabi-
tation, compared to more than 50% for the early 1990's, with remar-
riages even more likely to be preceded by cohabitation.76 A 2004 
study established that 50% of individuals in the United States will co-
habit by age forty.77 Although rates of marriage now differ among 
young white, black, and Hispanic women, rates of cohabitation hover 
around 50% for young women in all groups.78 
But cohabitation is not limited to the very young or the childless. 
Between 25% and 40% of children live with a cohabiting parent at 
some point.79 Couples cohabit for a variety of reasons and exit in a 
variety of ways. 80 Some cohabit as a prelude to marriage, but others 
cohabit for reasons of convenience or to save money or as an alterna-
tive to marriage.s1 
Figure 4 captures the growing heterogeneity of relationships, show-
ing the decline in the percentage of younger women in a first marriage 
and a sharp rise in the percentage never married and cohabiting. 
75 Cherlin, note 7, at 849. 
76 See Pamela J. Smock, Cohabitation in the United States: An Appraisal of Research 
Themes, Findings, and Implications, 26 Ann. Rev. Soc. 1, 3 (2000) (citing Larry Bumpass & 
Hsien-Hen Lu, Trends in Cohabitation and Implications for Children's Family Contests in 
the U.S. (Ctr. for Demography & Ecology, U. Wisc.-Madison, Working Paper No. 98-15, 
1999)); Larry L. Bumpass & James A. Sweet, National Estimates of Cohabitation, 26 De-
mography 615 (1989). Rates of cohabitation appear to have accelerated in the 1990's: 
"[T]he proportion of all first unions (including both marriages and cohabitations) that be-
gin as cohabitations rose from 46% for unions formed between 1980 and 1984 to almost 
60% for those formed between 1990 and 1994. Smock, supra, at 3. 
11 Patrick Heuveline & Jeffrey M. Timberlake, The Role of Cohabitation in Family For-
mation: The United States in Comparative Perspective, 66 J. Marriage & Fam. 1214, 1222 
fig.1 (2004). 
78 Ctr. for Disease Control, note 71. 
79 Heuveline & Timberlake, note 77, at 1224 (finding that about one-third of children 
will experience maternal cohabitation by age sixteen (fig. 2)); Smock, note 76, at 3. 
80 For additional evidence, see Pamela J. Smock, Penelope Huang, Wendy D. Manning 
& Cara A. Bergstrom, Heterosexual Cohabitation in the United States: Motives for Living 
Together Among Young Men and Women 4 (U. Mich. Population Stud. Ctr., Working 
Paper No. 06-606, 2006), available at www.psc.isr.umich.edu/pubs/pdf/rr06-606.pdf. 
s1 Id. at 13-19. 
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The decline in marriage has transformed children's family arrange-
ments as well: A strong trend, accelerating since 1990, is the rise in 
child-bearing and child-rearing among the unmarried. Among chil-
dren born in 2009, 41 % had unmarried mothers,83 up from 10.7% in 
1970, 18.4% in 1980, 28% in 1990, and 33.2% in 2000.84 Trends over 
time are striking. From 1970 to 2002, the percentage of children living 
in two-parent families fell from 85% to 69%, and those living in sin-
gle-parent families more than doubled, from 11 % to 27%.85 In 2012, 
64% of children lived with their married parents, but 36% did not, 
with 24% living with their mothers only.86 
B. The Growing Heterogeneity of Marriage 
The de-institutionalization of marriage has altered the social norms 
that define and regulate marriage, with the result that people no 
longer share a standard set of expectations about behavior, roles, and 
outcomes in marriage.87 
82 See Ctr. for Disease Control, note 71. 
83 U.S. Census Bureau, note 28, at 70 tbl.89, available at http://www.census.gov/compen 
dia/statab/2012/tables/12s0089.pdf. 
84 U.S. Census Bureau, note 69, at 23 tbl.HS-14, available at http://www.census.gov/ 
statab/hist/HS-14.pdf. 
85 Adam Thomas & Isabel Sawhill, For Love and Money? The Impact of Family Struc-
ture on Family Income, 15 Marriage & Child Wellbeing 57, 58 (2005). 
86 U.S. Census Bureau, note 1, at tbl.C3. 
87 Cherlin puts the matter this way: "[W]hen social change produces situations outside 
the reach of established norms, individuals can no longer rely on shared understandings of 
how to act. Rather, they must negotiate new ways of acting, a process that is a potential 
source of conflict and opportunity." Cherlin, note 7, at 848. 
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Mid-twentieth-century marriages typically featured early child-
bearing, gendered roles in the marital household, and sharp differ-
ences in the employment trajectories of husbands and wives. In the 
typical pattern, husbands worked outside the home, while wives did 
not.88 Wives who did work typically held jobs with lower status and 
significantly lower pay.89 
By contrast, today's married couples make up the rules against the 
backdrop of the new individualism. A 2001 survey of young adults 
provides striking evidence of attitudes that would have been unthink-
able in mid-twentieth-century America: 
• 62% agreed that "[l)iving together with someone before marriage 
is a good way to avoid an eventual divorce."90 
• 82% endorsed the idea that "[i)t is extremely important to [me] 
to be economically set before [I] get married. "91 
• More than "80% of the women agreed that it is more important 
'to have a husband who can communicate about his deepest feel-
ings than to have a husband who makes a good living.' "92 
Data confirm that marriage today differs significantly from its mid-
twentieth-century predecessor. One striking change is that marriage 
typically occurs much later in the life course, after the careers of both 
individuals are well underway. In 2011, the median age at first mar-
riage in the United States was twenty-nine for men and twenty-seven 
for women.93 By contrast, in 1955, the typical man married at age 
twenty-three and the typical woman at age twenty.94 As late as 1990, 
the figures were twenty-six and twenty-four, respectively.95 Figure 5 
illustrates the rise and fall of mid-twentieth-century marriage. 
88 Id. at 854. 
89 See Richard Fry & D'Vera Cohn, Pew Research Ctr., Women, Men and the New 
Economics of Marriage (Jan. 19, 2010), available at http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1466/ 
economics-marriage-rise-of-wives. 
90 Id. at 856. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 U.S. Census Bureau, note 27 (28.7 and 26.5, respectively). 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
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FIGURE 596 
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From 1940 to 1990, individuals actually married at younger ages 
than in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth. By 1990, the 
age of marriage caught up to and then quickly exceeded the nine-
teenth-century baseline. 
Marriage has simultaneously become more transient, as Americans 
marry, divorce, and remarry (or cohabit) more frequently than before. 
Family law now permits ready divorce: "No-fault" divorce of some 
kind is available in every state. 97 
The raw divorce rate (divorces per year per 1000 population) con-
veys some, but only some, of the change in marital behavior. Starting 
from a low 2.2% in 1960, the raw divorce rate rose to or above 5% 
from the mid-1970's to mid-1980's.98 The raw divorce rate declined 
thereafter and as of 2008 stood at just 3.5%.99 But the raw marriage 
rate (marriages per 1000 population) has continued its long-term de-
cline, from 10.6% in 1970 to 7.1 % today, with the result that the di-
vorce rate affects fewer married people. As a rough cut, the raw 
divorce rate relative to (divided by) the raw marriage rate has risen, 
from .26 in 1960 and .33 in 1970 to .49 today.100 
A clearer picture of divorce trends emerges from studies of the per-
centage of marriages lasting to the fifth, tenth, fifteenth, and later an-
96 Id. 
97 Judith C. Areen, Marc Spindelman & Philomela Tsoukala, Family Law 719 (6th ed. 
2012). 
98 U.S. Census Bureau, note 28. 
99 Id. 
100 Author's calculations from U.S. Census Bureau, note 28. 
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niversaries. Among marriages entered into by men in the 1960-1964 
period, for example, 94.6% of marriages lasted at least until the fifth 
anniversary and 74.7% lasted at least until the 15th anniversary.101 By 
contrast, of marriages entered into by men in 1985 to 1989, 87.7% 
lasted until the fifth anniversary and only 66.6% lasted until the fif-
teenth anniversary. (We do not yet have comparable data on later 
marriage cohorts.)102 
As recently as 1990, the percentage of Americans who were di-
vorced was 8.3%, while in 2010 it was 10.4%.103 Taking a 2009 snap-
shot, the Census Bureau found that 21 % of marriages involved men 
married twice or more, while 20% of marriages involved women mar-
ried twice or more.104 First marriages ending in divorce lasted a me-
dian eight years.105 Divorced men and women who married a second 
time did so, on average, within four years after their first marriage 
ended.106 
Many individuals are separated, divorced, and remarried early on: 
In 2009, men who terminated first marriages had a median age at di-
vorce of thirty-two, while women had a median age of thirty.107 The 
typical man entering a second marriage was thirty-six, and the typical 
woman was thirty-three.108 Remarriage after divorce is common: The 
1995 CDC study found that a divorced woman had a 75% change of 
remarrying within ten years.109 Remarriage probabilities varied 
among groups but were relatively high among younger women and 
women in households earning more than $50,000.110 
Amidst these changes gender roles within marriage have shifted no-
ticeably. Married women today typically hold paid jobs, even during 
child-rearing years, and wives tend to hold jobs at roughly the same 
level of pay and status as their husbands.111 Figure 6 shows the well-
known increase in wives' labor-force participation beginning in the 
mid-twentieth-century .112 
101 U.S. Census Bureau, note 66, at tbl.4. 
102 Id. 
103 U.S. Census Bureau, note 28, at 52 tbl.56. 
104 U.S. Census Bureau, note 66, at 19 tbl.10. 
10s Id. at 15. 
106 Id. at 18 tbl.8. 
101 Id. at 17 tbl.7. 
108 Id. 
109 Matthew D. Bramlett & William D. Mosher, Cohabitation, Marriage, Divorce, and 
Remarriage in the United States, 23 Vital & Health Statistics 78 tbl.37 (2002). 
no Id. 
l11 See Christine R. Schwartz, Earnings Inequality and the Changing Association Be-
tween Spouses' Earnings, 115 Am. J. Soc. 1524, 1524-25 (2010). 
112 See U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Labor Force Statistics from the Current Popula-
tion Survey tbl.2 (Employment Status of the Civilian Noninstitutional Population 16 Years 
and Over by Sex, 1972 to Date) (Feb. 1913), http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat02.htm. 
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FIGURE 6113 
Labor Force Participation, 1970-2010 
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As the figure illustrates, the influx of women into the workforce did 
not begin and end in the 1970's. Instead, the upward trend continued 
through the 1990's. By 2010, the difference in participation for single 
and married women was only two percentage points apart (63.3% vs. 
61 % )114 compared with twenty-three percentage points in 1950 
(46.3% vs. 23%).115 See Figure 7 below. 
113 U.S. Census Bureau, note 28, at 384 tbl.597. 
114 Id. . 
115 Id. at 384 tbl.598; U.S. Census Bureau, note 69, at 53 tbl.HS30, http://www.census 
.gove/statab/hist/HS-30.pdf. 
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Trends among couples with both spouses under age fifty-five are 
even starker. In 1969, 54.2% of couples had a working wife, while in 
1998, 82.2% did.11 7 
In 2010 wives contributed 37.6% of family income, compared to 
26.6% in 1970.118 Wives earn more than husbands in nearly a quarter 
of marriages, compared with less than 5% in 1970.119 The dynamics of 
the marriage search have changed as well: No longer does a (typical) 
high-earning man seek to marry a low-earner destined to be a stay-at-
home mother. Today, one high-earner is increasingly likely to marry 
another. All else equal, high-earning women are actually more likely 
to marry than lower-earning peers.120 
Still, it would be a mistake to reach the happy conclusion that gen-
der has disappeared in American family life. True, married couples 
are more gender-egalitarian in their division of household work. 
116 U.S. Census Bureau, note 28, at 384 tbl.598. 
111 See Katharine Bradbury & Jane Katz, Wives' Work and Family Income Mobility 27 
tbl.1 (Federal Res. Bank of Boston, Public Pol'y Discussion Paper No. 04-3, 2005), availa-
ble at http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/ppdp/2004/ppdp0403.pdf. 
11s See U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Women in the Labor Force: A Databook 80 
tbl.24 (Feb. 2013), available at http://www.bls.gov/cps/wlf-databook-2012.pdf. 
119 Fry & Cohn, note 89; see also U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, note 118, at 84 tbl.25, 
http://www.bls.gov/cps/wlf-table25-2011.pdf (showing the percentage of wives earning more 
among two-earner couples). 
120 Megan M. Sweeney, Two Decades of Family Change: The Shifting Economic Foun-
dations of Marriage, 67 Am. Soc. Rev. 132, 132 (2002) (comparing marital formation in a 
cohort born in the early 1950's with that of a cohort born in the early to mid-1960's). 
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From 1975 to 2000, married mothers reduced their hours of house-
work as they increased their time spent in paid employment, while 
married fathers increased their hours of child care and housework and 
decreased their hours of paid work and personal time.121 Counting 
time spent in both market work and unpaid work, mothers and fathers 
now work equally long weeks (and longer total weeks than in 1975).122 
Even so, the division of labor is not perfectly equal: In 2000, married 
fathers did 64 % of paid work and 34 % of unpaid work.123 
Today, the gendered division of labor falls heavily on the rising pro-
portion of single mothers, who bear a heavy burden of care work 
along with paid employment. When romantic relationships end, 
whether by divorce or by the end of cohabitation, mothers are over-
whelmingly left with primary responsibility for the day-to-day care of 
children.124 In 2010, for example, 7.2% of all households were headed 
by single mothers, while only 2.4% were headed by single fathers. 125 
A supermajority of single mothers combine care work with paid work: 
Even during the current recession, two-thirds of single mothers work 
outside the home.126 
C. The Tightening Link Between Marriage and Class 
Despite these changes, lasting marriage and child-bearing and child-
rearing within marriage have one last bastion in the United States: 
the upper class. To a far greater degree than in the twentieth century, 
lasting marriage that involves living with one's own biological children 
(and no others) has become a form of social privilege, correlated with 
other forms of social privilege.127 "The culture is shifting, and mar-
riage has almost become a luxury item, one that only the well-edu-
cated and well paid are interested in," according to Isabel Sawhill, a 
leading researcher on inequality.128 
To be sure, the American upper class does not follow the patterns 
of mid-twentieth-century marriage. As a group, better-educated and 
121 Suzanne M. Bianchi, John P. Robinson & Melissa A. Milkie, Changing Rhythms of 
American Family Life 64-67, 111 (2006). 
122 Id. at 170. 
123 Id. at 116-17 tbl.6.1. 
124 Id. at 67-68, 170. 
125 U.S. Census Bureau, Households and Families: 2010, at 8 tbl.3, http://www.census 
.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c201 Obr-14.pdf. 
126 U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Economic News Releases, Employment Characteris-
tics of Families tbl.4 (Families with Own Children: Employment Status of Parents by Age 
of Youngest Child and Family Type, 2011-2012 Annual Averages)(Apr. 26, 2013), available 
at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/famee.t04.htm. 
121 See Blaine Harden, Numbers Drop for the Married with Children: Institution Be-
coming the Choice of the Educated, Affluent, Wash. Post, Mar. 4, 2007, at A3. 
128 Id. (quoting Isabel V. Sawhill, Senior Fellow, Brookings Inst.). 
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higher-income individuals marry later than those in lower socioeco-
nomic classes; over a lifetime, however, they marry at higher rates.129 
Divorce rates also correlate with class: While 46% of marriages end 
in divorce (or permanent separation) within ten years among high-
school dropouts, and 37% end within ten years for high-school gradu-
ates, only 16% end in that period for those with a B.A. or more.130 
Data from the Census Bureau illustrate the close association of co-
habitation with lower-income groups and marriage with higher-in-
come status. In 2011, more than half of unmarried-couple households 
had incomes at or below the fortieth percentile of the income distribu-
tion.131 In neat symmetry, more than 50% of married couples had 
incomes at or above the sixtieth income percentile, and more than 
30% had incomes at or above the eightieth percentile.132 
Bolstering the association between lasting marriage and higher in-
come, divorce rates fall with income and with educational attain-
ment.133 In 2012, 63.7% of all American men age thirty-five to thirty-
nine were married, but only 52 % of men (in that age group) with 
earnings from $15,000-$25,000, and only 50.1 % of men with earnings 
from $5,000 to $15,000.134 By comparison, 80.1 % of men age thirty-
five and thirty-nine with earnings over $100,000 were married.135 
The longevity of marriage now varies strikingly by social class, as 
Figure 8 shows. 
129 See Cherlin, note 19, at 403-04. 
130 See id. at 405 fig. l. 
131 Robert Groves, Dir., U.S. Census Bureau, Changing American Households 16, avail-
able at http://www.census.gov/newsroom/pdf/cah_slides.pdf. 
132 Id. 
133 See Bramlett & Mosher, note 109, at 55 tbl.21. 
134 U.S. Census Bureau, note 1. 
135 Id. 
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FIGURE 8136 
Probability That a Woman's First Marriage Will Last 5, 
10, 15, or 20 Years 
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Based on 2010 data, demographers estimate that 90% of the mar-
riages of women attaining a B.A. will last at least five years, compared 
to only 75% for women attaining only a high school diploma.137 By 
the twenty-year mark, the gap in lasting marriages is nearly forty per-
centage points between the more-educated group (78%) and the less-
educated (41 %).138 
Children's family status also varies by income and social class. Fig-
ure 9 shows the relationship between income level and parental 
marriage. 
136 Copen et al., note 72, at 16 tbl.5. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
Imaged with the permission of Tax Law Review of New York University School of Law 
2013] UPDATING THE WELFARE STATE 
FIGURE 9139 
Percentage of Children Living with Both (Married) Parents 
by Income Level, 2011 
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Of children in poverty, 34% live with their married parents, while 
81 % of those living at 200% of poverty or above do so.14° Figure 10 
presents similar statistics based on parents' educational attainment. 
While less than one-half of children of high-school dropouts live with 
married parents, a stunning 91 % of children with at least one parent 
with a graduate degree live with married parents.141 
FIGURE 10142 
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The data on new births is even more striking. In 2010, only 7% of 
births among women holding a B.A. or more occurred outside mar-
riage, compared to 36% for those with some college and 40% of those 
with a high school diploma.143 As Figure 11 shows, the percentage of 
nonmarital births among women with a high school diploma or some 
college has increased enormously since 1990.144 
FIGURE 11145 
Percentage of Births to Unmarried Women by Educational 
Attainment, 1990 and 2009 
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Even so, gender roles in these upper-class marriages differ signifi-
cantly from mid-twentieth-century marriage. Educated wives are 
more likely than less-educated wives to work outside the home and to 
earn more than their husbands.146 
What causes the correlation between marriage and class? One the-
ory holds that lasting marriage boosts economic achievement: Mar-
ried people have greater support at home and can take greater risks 
(and reap bigger rewards) in the marketplace.147 Alternatively, 
143 See U.S. Census Bureau, Fertility of American Women: 2010-Detailed Tables tbl.8, 
available at www.census.gov/hhes/fertility/data/cps/2010.html. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
146 U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, note 118, at 24 tbl.8 (showing that 65.9% of all wo-
men were employed in 2011, including 40.6% of high school dropouts, 60.2% of those with 
a high school diploma but no college, and 76.2% of those with a B.A. or more). A whop-
ping 86.1 % of women with a doctoral degree were employed. Id. 
147 See Robert I. Lerman, Marriage and the Economic Well-Being of Families with Chil-
dren: A Review of the Literature 4-7 (2002), available at http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID 
=410541; Robert I. Lerman, Married and Unmarried Parenthood and Economic Well-Be-
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money and class position may make lasting marriage possible, because 
well-off couples can avoid financial distress and can buy their way out 
of squabbles over household tasks by hiring help.148 A third line of 
thinking posits that some personal characteristic, like patience, insight, 
persistence, long-range thinking, or even personal charm, might assist 
some people in attaining both lasting marriage and economic 
success.149 
D. Family Law and the New Individualism 
Property and family law rules have evolved to accommodate indi-
vidualism. Cohabiting couples operate under ordinary state property 
law: When they break up, each person takes only what is his or her 
own, and, absent extraordinary circumstances, neither party owes sup-
port to the other.15° Family law may appear to alter these default 
rules for married couples, who-in theory-face court-supervised di-
vision of property and may owe spousal support (that is, alimony). 
But in the vast majority of cases, divorced couples part ways in much 
the same way as cohabiting couples: Each takes his or her own prop-
erty, and neither owes much, if any, spousal support (alimony) to the 
other.151 According to the American Bar Association, only 15% of all 
divorce cases include alimony payments.152 
Property division and alimony are de facto irrelevant for most 
couples for two reasons. First, a substantial majority of Americans 
have little or no wealth other than their human capital (economists' 
term for earning power). Property division at divorce may be mildly 
ing: A Dynamic Analysis of a Recent Cohort 7 (2002), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/ 
marriage-well-being03/parenthood.pdf. 
148 See Cherlin, note 19, at 404 (noting that it "remains unclear" why class patterns in 
family formation are diverging, but that "it is tempting" to associate that divergence with 
labor market trends). 
149 For a review of a variety of theories, see Thomas & Sawhill, note 85. 
1so The famous "palimony" case of Marvin v. Marvin, 176 Cal. Rptr. 555, 558-59 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1981) (overturning a lower court award to Michelle Marvin) requires payments 
between separating cohabitants only on the showing of an explicit contract, a standard 
rarely met in such cases. 
151 See Judith G. McMullen & Debra Oswald, Why Do We Need A Lawyer?: An Em-
pirical Study of Divorce Cases, 12 J.L. & Fam. Stud. 57, 75 (2010) (finding that alimony was 
awarded in only 9% of cases in a county in Wisconsin in 2005, and that most of these 
awards were temporary or would terminate upon specified events (for example, the sale of 
a house or car)). For discussion of the limited duration and amount of alimony awards, see 
Carolyn J. Frantz & Hanoch Dagan, Properties of Marriage, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 75, 119 
(2004). 
152 Alicia B. Kelly, Actualizing Intimate Partnership Theory, 50 Fam. Ct. Rev. 258, 260 
(2012) (citing Jeff Atkinson, The American Bar Association Guide to Family Law (2011)). 
The U.S. Census Bureau finds basically the same result, with alimony awards in 15.5% of 
divorces. See Gordon H. Lester, U.S. Census Bureau, Child Support and Alimony: 1989, 
at 12 (1990), available at www2.census.gov/prod2/popscan/p60-173.pdf. 
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painful, but other than modest pension rights and a little equity in a 
home and car, many couples have nominal assets to divide. In 2010, 
for example, the median income of U.S. families was $49,800, and the 
median net worth was $77,300.153 But that figure, modest as it is, 
overstates the financial position of many Americans. Among families 
headed by an individual aged thirty-five to forty-four, for example (a 
group heavily represented in divorce), median net worth was $9300. 
Twenty-five percent of Americans in 2010 had negative net worth.154 
Second, the law of alimony by its terms applies primarily in a factual 
setting that is increasingly rare: long-term marriage between spouses 
with very unequal earnings, high family income, and specialized gen-
der roles.155 Critics charge that alimony is increasingly unfair to men, 
because women have greater options outside the home.156 And sev-
eral states have moved to limit alimony, including liberal 
Massach usetts.157 
Property division tends to follow a fifty-fifty split, whether in com-
mon law or community property states, and only marital property 
(typically, property purchased with earnings during the marriage) is 
subject to division. Even in the nine community property states,158 
the law often defaults to an individualist pattern.159 
Thus, family and property law mirrors the new individualism in 
marriage. The law might, of course, take a different direction. The 
American Law Institute, for example, has proposed to extend to some 
cohabiting couples the property and support rights accorded to mar-
ried couples.16° Canada permits courts to award alimony to cohab-
153 Jesse Bricker, Arthur B. Kennickell, Kevin B. Moore & John Sabelhaus, Changes in 
U.S. Family Finances from 2007 to 2010: Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances, 
98 Fed. Res. Bull. 1, 7 tbl.1, 17 tbl.4 (2012). 
154 Id. at 18 tbl.4. 
155 See Judith G. McMullen, Alimony: What Social Science and Popular Culture Tell Us 
About Women, Guilt, and Spousal Support After Divorce 45-47 (2011) (noting that ali-
mony is typically payable only by long-term spouses who have the ability to pay and are 
divorcing a needy spouse); Kelly, note 152, at 260 (reporting that "alimony is more myth 
than reality" and citing data showing "that alimony awards are declining and are granted in 
only about 15% of divorces, and even when awarded, are typically low in amount and short 
in duration"). 
156 Lizette Alvarez, In an Age of Dual Incomes, Alimony Payers Prod States to Update 
Divorce Laws, N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 2012, at All. 
157 Jess Bidgood, Alimony in Massachusetts Gets Overhaul, With Limits, N.Y. Times, 
Sept. 27, 2011, at AIL See Am. Law Inst., Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: 
Analysis and Recommendations 895-97 (2002) [hereinafter ALI]. 
158 Douglas E. Abrams, Naomi R. Cahn, Catherine J. Ross & David D. Meyer, Contem-
porary Family Law 473(3d. ed. 2012) (listing Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Ne-
vada, New Mexico, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin). 
159 Kelly, note 152, at 261. 
160 ALI, note 157, at 974-77. For criticism of this proposal, see, e.g., Marsha Garrison, 
Marriage Matters: What's Wrong with the ALi's Domestic Partnership Proposal?, in 
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iting couples who dissolve their relationship.161 And scholars have 
proposed re-introducing common law marriage in order to extend 
family-law protections for marriage to long-term cohabitation.162 
***** 
In their classic study of marriage in 1965, Peter Berger and Han-
sfried Kellner found that marriage "occupies a privileged status 
among the significant validating relationships for adults in our society 
.... Marriage is a crucial nomic instrumentality in our society."163 
Marriage in this sense no longer exists. Certainly, some couples still 
marry early, adopt traditional gender roles, and persist in marriage for 
the long-term, but their marriages no longer resemble those Berger 
and Kellner described, because they are unusual rather than the norm. 
The result, as explained further in the next Part, is that the presumed 
social context for joint filing and the spousal benefit simply no longer 
exists. Reform is imperative, but the direction for reform depends 
critically on one's ideals for income taxation and social insurance. 
IV. UPDATING THE INCOME TAX: JOINT FILING 
AND THE NEW INDIVIDUALISM 
The new individualism poses serious policy challenges for the in-
come tax. The decline in marriage, the rise in cohabitation, and the 
growing ranks of the never-married mean that formal marriage no 
longer demarcates family life. Many people form and dissolve rela-
tionships outside marriage-and they bear and rear children outside 
marriage as well. The growing heterogeneity of marriage means that 
even among married couples, the law cannot infer that traditional ac-
tivities are taking place: Married couples today may or may not rear 
children, conform to traditional gender roles, expect to remain mar-
ried for the long-term, or expect to share their economic fortune "for 
better or worse." 
The result is that tax policy now faces, once more, the two chal-
lenges that confronted the income tax before the adoption of income-
splitting in 1948. First, should the tax system attempt to take notice of 
family ties in assessing individuals' well-being? Second, how impor-
Reconceiving the Family: Critique on the American Law Institute's Principles of the Law 
of Family Dissolution 305, 306-27 (2006). 
161 See Jeanne Lafortune, Pierre-Andre Chiappori, Murat Iyigun & Yoram Weiss, 
Changing the Rules Midway: The Impact of Granting Alimony Rights on Existing and 
Newly-Formed Partnerships (Mar. 2012) (unpublished article), available at http://www.co 
lumbia.edu/-pc2167 /CIL WCommonlaw03 l 912.pdf. 
162 Cynthia G. Bowman, A Feminist Proposal to Bring Back Common Law Marriage, 75 
Or. L. Rev. 709, 710-11, 779-80 (1996). 
163 Berger & Kellner, note 4, at 5. 
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tant is the problem of income-shifting via intrafamily transfers of as-
sets, and how, if at all, can the tax system combat the loss of 
progressivity that accompanies them? 
In this Part, I argue that the new demographics of the family render 
joint filing obsolete-whatever one's views about the sanctity and de-
sirability of marriage. 
To see how the new individualism undermines joint filing, recall the 
two major problems that income-splitting solved in 1948. First, the 
income-splitting joint return provided a reasonably accurate assess-
ment of individuals' family status and, thus, a reasonable measure of 
well-being derived from shared income and relational commitments 
from others.164 Second, joint filing prevented tax-motivated transfers 
of assets and income between husbands and wives. 165 
The problem is that joint filing no longer serves either purpose par-
ticularly well. There are two principal alternatives to joint filing: 
household filing (which aggregates income across a "household," 
which is more expansive than the formally-married couple) or individ-
ual filing. 
The United States might glean some guidance from the other coun-
tries in the OECD, which face similar (though not identical) demo-
graphic shifts and have increasingly turned to individual filing. In 
2011, among thirty-four countries studied by the OECD in 2010-2011, 
only eleven had joint filing of any type.166 Even among countries with 
some form of joint filing, several permit spouses to elect separate fil-
ing, and two include unmarried partners in addition to formal 
spouses.167 
In the following discussion, I do not advocate either individual filing 
or expanded joint filing. My point is not that one is clearly superior, 
and indeed, both have drawbacks. My point, instead, is that joint fil-
ing is, today, insupportable on any of a range of normative views 
about what the income tax ought to accomplish. 
A. Updating the Trifumma 
To frame the policy problem now facing the income tax, return to 
the trilemma: An income tax cannot simultaneously: 
164 See, e.g., Joint Comm. on Tax'n, Present Law and Background Relating to Proposals 
to Reduce the Marriage Tax Penalty, Scheduled for a Public Hearing Before the House 
Committee on Ways and Means § l.B. {1998). 
l65 See id. 
166 OECD, Taxing Wages: 2011, at 220, 288, 300, 310, 340, 392, 434, 444, 486, 506, 536, 
available at http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/taxing-wages-20ll_tax_wages-2011-en 
(Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Luxemburg, Norway, Poland, Spain, Switzer-
land, and the United States). 
167 Id. (France, Luxembourg). 
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(1) impose progressive marginal tax rates; 
(2) assess equal taxes on married couples with equal earnings; and 
(3) maintain marriage neutrality (meaning that the total income tax 
paid by two unmarried individuals neither increases nor de-
creases when the couple marries). 
The rise of the new individualism requires us to adapt the trilemma 
to reflect the new social reality. When marriage is no longer an insti-
tution, it is no longer obvious that equality across married couples is 
an important social goal. Family life now occurs outside marriage as 
often as in it, and marriage itself no longer has standard content. 
But if we revise principle (2) to assert the importance of equal-earn-
ing households or families, the trilemma springs back into the realm of 
social relevance. This is precisely what poverty researchers do: They 
attempt to assess family or household situations, not individual 
earnings. 
Restated, then, the new trilemma looks like this. An income tax 
cannot simultaneously: 
(1) impose progressive marginal tax rates; 
(2) assess equal taxes on households with equal earnings; and 
(3) maintain household neutrality (meaning that the total income 
taxes paid by individuals residing separately will neither in-
crease nor decrease when they form a household). 
Restating the trilemma helps revitalize our sense of the policy 
stakes. Assuming policymakers wish to preserve progressive rates, 
then either the income tax must opt for individual filing or it must 
tackle the task of defining (and monitoring) a new unit, the house-
hold, which represents a social grouping with normative significance 
for taxation. 
The restated trilemma begins to illustrate the obsolescence of joint 
filing based on formal marriage. The trilemma's principle (2) reflects 
the idea that resources are shared and used in socially-meaningful 
groupings of people. In the mid-twentieth century, marriage was not 
just one such grouping; it was the primary grouping for Americans of 
all ages.168 The new individualism has destroyed the easy elision of 
"marriage" with "family," with the result that formal marriage no 
longer can suffice to implement principle (2). 
Still, the trilemma, as elegant as it is, represents only a first cut at 
the problem of taxing the family. Before we can conclude that the 
new individualism has vitiated joint filing, we need to take a closer 
168 Pew Research Ctr., The Decline of Marriage and Rise of New Families 1-3 (2010), 
available at http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2010/1 l/pew-social-trends-2010-families. 
pdf (finding that in 1960, 72% of all American adults were married, while in 2008 that 
figure had fallen to 52%; among adults ages twenty to twenty-nine, the marriage rate has 
declined from 68% in 1960 to 26% in 2008). 
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look at the rationales for aggregating income and at the administrative 
considerations that helped give rise to joint filing in the first place. 
Accordingly, in the remainder of this Part, I pursue two aims. First, 
I examine three ideals of income taxation (liberal, welfarist, and social 
conservative), and I demonstrate that joint filing might have been 
plausible according to any of them in the mid-twentieth century-but 
no longer can claim a normative grounding in any of them. Second, I 
consider the administrative challenges of implementing either individ-
ual filing or household filing in the age of the new individualism. 
An important corollary of the analysis here is that we should not 
mistake allegiance to joint filing with allegiance to marriage. We 
sometimes equate joint filing with tradition and with the valorization 
of marriage (or, at least, I did so, until I thought it through). But, in 
fact, joint filing poorly serves the goal of rewarding or encouraging 
marriage, compared to alternative policies. 
B. Liberal Individualism and Individual Filing 
Liberalism encompasses a variety of theories, but all share commit-
ments to individual freedom and equality, pluralism, state neutrality, 
and individual responsibility. These values dovetail with the new indi-
vidualism and endorse individual filing as the best policy response. 
The liberal ideal of income taxation aims to capture differentials in 
individual fortune produced by undeserved good and bad luck.169 
Taking this view, individuals should choose the family lives that seem 
best to them, and the state should take no notice of family ties. Con-
cretely, then, the state should assess taxes based on individual, not 
joint, filing, and tax liability should not vary based on formal marriage 
or other family activities, including support owed to or received from 
marital partners.17° 
These principles seem to harmonize with the new individualism, 
which leaves family relationships to individual choice and revision. 
Liberalism famously-and infamously171-treats each individual as a 
169 Ronald Dworkin, for example, proposes an income tax as a second-best approach to 
income insurance, which would pay benefits to those who could only earn low incomes and 
would tax those who had the capacity to earn high incomes. Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign 
Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality 99-109 (2000). Philippe Van Parijs justifies an 
income tax as a tax on undeserved rents from holding jobs, particularly good jobs. Van 
Parijs, note 21, at 108-24. 
110 I leave to another occasion the state's proper stance toward children and child-rear-
ing. See, e.g., Anne L. Alstott, No Exit: What Parents Owe Their Children and What 
Society Owes Parents 205-11 (2004) (arguing that a liberal state ought to transfer addi-
tional resources to parents who meet their obligations to children). 
111 Liberalism and Its Critics (Michael J. Sandel ed., 1984); see Martha Minow, Redefin-
ing Families: Who's In and Who's Out?, 62 U. Colo. L. Rev. 269, 282 (1991); Martha 
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separate human being, capable of making decisions, including deci-
sions to form and leave relationships. On this view, two individuals 
with the same incomes properly pay the same tax, even if one is mar-
ried to a billionaire and the other to an unemployed surfer. The bil-
lionaire's spouse is likely better off in terms of material comforts while 
the relationship lasts, but the upside and downside risks are properly 
borne by the individual, who chose to enter the relationship and 
chooses to continue it. 
Joint filing, then, has little to recommend it from a liberal point of 
view-today. In fact, earlier liberal theories, notably John Rawls' A 
Theory of Justice,172 reflected the backdrop of mid-twentieth-century 
marriage and the primacy of formal marriage to family life. Rawls 
assumed that the nuclear family constituted the primary social unit, 
and that the family head (read: husband) would altruistically advance 
his family's interests.173 His assumption about altruism surely strains 
credulity in any period. But the assumption that the married couple is 
a social, psychological, and economic unit was correct in its time. 
As the 1970's passed into the 1980's, however, it became clear (to 
feminist scholars, at least) that the notion of the married couple as a 
unit fit uneasily with liberal commitments to individual autonomy.174 
Liberal scholars in the early 2000's have tended to endorse an individ-
ualist perspective, taking the position that individuals should deter-
mine for themselves the family obligations (if any) they wish to 
endorse.175 
A traditional argument for joint filing is that because married 
couples "pool" assets, their incomes cannot be measured separately. 
But the pooling argument rests on shaky empirical and normative 
ground from a liberal perspective. First, the empirical problem: The 
extent of pooling now varies enormously among married couples and 
cohabitants. Some cohabitants treat all resources in common, while 
many married couples do not, and the trend is toward greater individ-
ualism.176 Thus, the ready assertion that married couples "pool in-
Minow & Mary Lyndon Shanley, Relational Right and Responsibility: Revisioning The 
Family in Liberal Political Theory and Law, Hypatia, no. 1, 1996, at 1, 6-12. 
m John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 467 (1999). 
113 Id. at 111. 
174 See, e.g., Susan M. Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family 8-10, 99-109 (2008). 
175 See, e.g., Elizabeth Brake, Minimal Marriage 156-88 (2012). 
176 See, e.g., Fenabra R. Addo & Sharon Sassier, Financial Arrangements and Relation-
ship Quality in Low-Income Couples, 59 Fam. Rel. 408, 409 (2010) (noting evidence that 
"separate fiscal systems" have become more prevalent among married couples); Jan Pahl, 
Family Finances, Individualisation, Spending Patterns, and Access to Credit, 27 J. Socio-
Economics 577, 577 (2008) (reviewing data suggesting that "fewer couples are pooling their 
incomes and more are keeping all or part of their incomes in individual accounts to which 
their partner does not have access). 
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come," which might have been apt enough in the mid-twentieth 
century, does not fit easily the contours of twenty-first-century 
marriage. 
Next, the normative problem: It is not clear that "pooling" justifies 
aggregation of income in a liberal income tax. Liberalism treats each 
individual as a separate human being, capable of making decisions, 
including decisions to form and leave relationships. A good relation-
ship might (perhaps) increase one's taxes or a bad one decrease them 
(a possibility that I consider in Part V), but the individual remains the 
basic unit for assessing the benefits and burdens of equality. 
The new individualism has also changed the context for evaluating 
two administrative objections to individual filing. The first is that the 
tax system cannot accurately apportion earnings between spouses. 
This objection was weighty indeed in the era of mid-twentieth-century 
marriage. Even when income (say, the husband's earnings) nominally 
belonged to one individual, the social reality of joint accounts, exten-
sive home production, and long-term mutual dependency based on 
role specialization made it difficult to assess the economic value accru-
ing to each partner.111 
Today, by contrast, most women work, including most wives and 
most cohabiting women, and the degree of role specialization in 
couples has declined.178 The shorter average duration of marriage, 
the high probability of marital disruption, and the new patterns of sep-
arate accounting and spending all make it more accurate to attribute 
each individual's earnings and savings income to her and her alone. 
Following family law, the tax system might adopt a fifty-fifty presump-
tion for joint savings accounts and other jointly-held assets. 
Put another way, a central problem for past proposals for individual 
filing has been the treatment of the earned income of the married 
couple. Logically, the law must adopt one of just three options. The 
first is to return to pre-1948 law, in which Poe and Earl co-existed, at 
the cost of large tax disparities between common law and community 
property states. A second option would overrule Poe and follow the 
Earl rule in all states, disregarding community property. A third op-
tion would overrule Earl and split earnings (but not necessarily prop-
erty income) even in common law states, at the cost of steep tax 
differences between the married and the unmarried. Pamela Gann 
177 Richard S. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 157 (5th ed. 1998); Naomi Cahn, 
Looking At Marriage, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 1766, 1774-78 (2000) (reviewing Milton C. Regan 
Jr., Alone Together: Law and the Meanings of Marriage (1999)); see also Deborah A. 
Widiss, 89 Wash. U.L. Rev. 721, 748-57 (2012) (discussing how Social Security, tax, mar-
riage, and employee benefits laws incentivize specialization). 
178 See Kristin McCue & Manuelita Ureta, Women in the Workplace: Recent Economic 
Trends, 4 Tex. J. Women & L. 125, 127-129, 133-37, 155 (1995). 
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and Lawrence Zelenak, among others, have thoroughly canvassed 
these options.179 
The rise of the new individualism suggests that large disparities be-
tween the formally-married and unmarried are probably undesirable. 
Why go to the trouble of repealing joint returns only to re-enact in-
come-splitting in another form? When the great majority of adults 
were married for the long term in traditional marriages, these 
problems of income-splitting were acute, but the new individualism 
makes the marital unit less compelling as the exclusive focus for in-
come allocation issues. 
A second administrative issue surfaces, however, even if the law re-
tains Earl (and especially if the law overrules Poe). Recall that, in the 
pre-1948 period, married individuals could improperly shift earned in-
come by transferring assets: When H had high earnings and W had 
low earnings, the H-W couple could reduce their total taxes by trans-
ferring property (and, thus, property income) to W. As a couple, H-W 
were no worse off, but their federal income tax bill was considerably 
lower. 
Continuing the analysis from a liberal perspective, it is important to 
distinguish two cases, one of which constitutes tax avoidance, and one 
of which does not. A true transfer of assets from one individual to 
another (regardless of their relationship) does not amount to tax 
avoidance. If Alice gives $1000 or $1 million to Bertha, and the trans-
fer is genuine, meaning that Alice no longer controls the money or 
expects its return, then the tax system should view the money as Ber-
tha's, regardless of the nature of the relationship. Going forward, Ber-
tha is richer, and her tax liability should capture her greater income.180 
Sham transfers, by contrast, represent a problem even for a liberal 
income tax, precisely because the tax system is supposed to measure 
the income of each person. Imagine that A formally transfers prop-
erty to B, but both A and B know that the transfer changes nothing-
A will continue to manage the property and will take it back in an 
instant if she needs money for her business. That sham transfer, which 
changes nothing but income tax liabilities, should concern even the 
most die-hard liberal individualist. And, importantly, the sham trans-
fer should be equally objectionable whether A and B are married, a 
parent and child, or formally unrelated. 
119 See Gann, note 23, at 52-61; Zelenak, note 23, at 383-94. 
1so For analogous arguments, see Gann, note 23, at 52-61 (considering the positive gen-
der impact of elective income-shifting premised on legal property transfers); Shari Motro, 
A New "I Do": Towards a Marriage-Neutral Income Tax, 91 Iowa L. Rev. 1509, 1553 
(2006) (proposing elective joint filing based on "enforceable legal entitlements" to income-
splitting). 
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Formal marriage today is a poor conceptual fit for the problem of 
sham transfers. Mid-twentieth-century marriage created such lasting 
unity in the married couple that formal title transfer was rather mean-
ingless. Today, the situation is quite different: The new individualism 
in marriage makes marital partners more independent in their finan-
cial lives and far warier than in the past about formal asset transfers. 
No longer is marriage a lifelong commitment, begun in youth and ex-
pected to endure, with a psychological sense of unity. Marriage today 
more often involves older partners with separate careers and financial 
experience. Married couples witness the frequent break-up of peers' 
marriages. Blended families, too, can change the financial dynamics 
of family life. Not too surprisingly, then, the last generation has wit-
nessed a revolution in the internal finances of married couples. Many 
couples now maintain separate checking and retirement accounts and 
pay separately for household expenses. 181 
Joint filing, then, prevents only a subset of sham transfers (those 
occurring during formal marriage), and it does so at the considerable 
cost of ignoring individuals' separate identities and financial where-
withal. Once we give up-as liberal individualism insists we should-
the idea that the married couple is a social unit, we can begin to craft 
administrable solutions that can prevent sham transactions without re-
lying on formal marriage and while respecting individual identity. 
A number of legal rules might be adopted to curb sham transfers in 
individual filing. Canada, for instance, disregards many transfers of 
income between spouses and common law partners.182 Anthony In-
fanti proposes to permit elective nonrecognition on outright transfers 
of property but to disregard only property transfers in which the trans-
feror retains control or title.183 
To illustrate the many additional options for combatting sham trans-
fers of property, I sketch two more here. Both approaches take ad-
vantage of three features that characterize a sham transfer. To reduce 
an individual's tax liability, the property transfer must appear to (1) 
reduce the high-bracket taxpayer's assets for some period, without de-
priving her of (2) day-to-day control and (3) the power of disposition. 
To prevent sham transfers, then, the tax law needs to disrupt one or 
more of these planning features. 
First, the tax law might adopt a look-back rule, an idea that is used 
to combat sham transfers in other tax contexts.184 Under this ap-
181 See note 176. 
182 See Infanti, note 22, at 630-31 (describing Canadian assignment-of-income and prop-
erty attribution rules). 
183 Id. at 656-61. 
184 See, e.g., IRC § 1014(e) (one-year-look-back for property acquired by decedent by 
gift); § 2035(a) (three-year-look-back to gifts made within three years of death). 
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proach, a gift transfer to anyone-spouse or unmarried partner, par-
ent or child or stranger-would be deemed effective for purposes of 
the income tax only if formally recorded with the IRS. The notice of 
transfer would be provided to the transferee and would state that the 
transferor had given up day-to-day control and the power of disposi-
tion. The transfer would immediately be effective for income tax pur-
poses but would be disregarded ex post if that property (or other 
property up to the same amount)185 reverted to the original owner or 
his entity alter ego within a specified period. In that case, the transfer 
would be deemed void for tax purposes, and the original owner would 
owe taxes for the intervening period. The transferee probably should 
be allowed a refund of the taxes paid, but perhaps not, as a deliberate 
penalty for boomerang transfers and to avoid gaming by re-transfer. 
For example, suppose that at Time 1, high-bracket H transfers 
$100,000 in cash to low-bracket W. W would pay tax on the income at 
her rate thereafter, except that if she made a retransfer to H within 
some period (for example, ten years), H would owe taxes (payable in 
the year of the re-transfer and with interest) on all income during the 
intervening period. The look-back rule would apply even if W re-
transferred, say, real estate or a stock portfolio instead of cash; and a 
partial look-back would apply even if only, say, $25,000 flowed from 
WtoH. 
A key advantage of the look-back rule is that it could apply to any 
gift transfer, with no distinctions needed based on family status. 
Transfers would be equally subject to the rule whether between 
spouses, cohabitants, or strangers. Still, the attribution rules upon re-
transfer would require some attention. The look-back tax should be 
owed whether H or his corporation or partnership or trust received 
the retransfer. 
The proposal raises many design issues, including the treatment of 
partial transfers and transfers in trust. I do not attempt to address 
those issues here, except to note that they properly flag the nature of 
the sham transfer problem, which operates well beyond the married 
couple and minor children (whose situation is addressed by the kiddie 
tax). 186 The new individualism has strengthened lineal ties while 
weakening horizontal (marriage) ties, and so attention to sham trans-
fers to adult children may be increasingly important. 
Another general design issue involves the attribution rules. An 
open design issue is whether the look-back rule would apply if W 
transferred the funds to an individual related to H-say, H's brother 
185 To avoid obvious problems of tracing, the look-back rule would apply to any transfer 
of any property flowing the other direction during the look-back period. 
186 IRC § l(g). 
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or second wife or live-in partner. An individualist might be inclined 
not to worry too much about such transfers. After all, a re-transfer to 
anyone other than the original transferor (H in my example) would 
not fit the transactional profile of a sham transaction between individ-
uals willing to disregard the consequences of formal title transfer. 
Still, the issue highlights the importance of redesigning attribution 
rules in light of the new individualism. I do not attempt an extended 
treatment here, but it is interesting to note that the realities of twenty-
first-century marriage do have policy implications for attribution, 
which is critical in corporate and partnership tax. For example, § 318 
now attributes ownership between husbands and wives and between 
parents and children.187 Individualist attribution might drop the mari-
tal category altogether. By contrast, a strong and suspicious approach 
to attribution would have to draw a wider net to detect the household 
extending beyond the marital couple: One's live-in partner and per-
haps his or her children might be just as appropriate for attribution as, 
say, one's husband. 
A second reform would coordinate state law with federal tax law to 
give greater effect to formal legal transfers. State law already en-
forces formal transfers for cohabitants, who (except in rare cases of 
palimony, a claim very difficult to sustain) have no rights to property 
in which the other holds formal title.188 States might agree to give full 
effect, even within marriage, to formal title transfers disclosed to the 
IRS. The aim would be to override equitable-division or community-
property rules in order to make it even less likely that H would trans-
fer title to most of his assets to W, risking the loss of $100,000 for the 
sake of tax avoidance. 
This second rule would apply only to title transfers disclosed to the 
IRS, and procedures would be designed to ensure that both spouses 
were aware of the transfer. Disclosure of the rights of the recipient as 
part of the process could also strengthen the "stickiness" of the trans-
fer. To give some protection against duress, the rule might be made a 
default, so that spouses could prove out of it on equitable grounds at 
divorce. 
These rules require further scrutiny to ensure that they could not be 
abused, say, to cheat a dependent spouse out of joint assets. Disclo-
sure to the IRS, perhaps a public recording of the title transfer, and 
the opportunity to prove duress or disadvantage might discourage 
abuse. 
187 IRC § 318(a)(l)(A). 
188 See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-1 (2011). 
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C. Welfarism and Household Aggregation 
Welfarists too differ in their commitments and yet share a common 
set of values. Very generally, welfarists seek to maximize aggregate 
utility or welfare.189 Debates center on what counts as welfare and 
how to weight the welfare of each individual, but the consensus view is 
that welfare (and not rights, or freedom, or some other feature of soci-
ety) should be the metric for judging among alternative legal systems, 
social arrangements, and so on. 
For simplicity, in the following discussion I adopt the commitment 
of classical utilitarianism to equal weighting of all individual utilities, 
but that assumption does relatively little work toward my key conclu-
sion, which is that joint filing based on formal marriage no longer 
serves any plausible welfarist purpose. The new individualism has a 
direct impact on a welfarist income tax, which aims to redistribute re-
sources and channel behavior based on functional categories-what 
people do-rather than formal ones. 
A few words of background explain why. A welfarist tax system, 
like any other social institution, would ideally maximize aggregate 
utility. In principle, then, aggregate welfare achieved in all possible 
states of the world should be evaluated holistically and comparatively. 
The tax system, for instance, should be evaluated in all its possible 
forms (for example, income taxation, consumption taxation, and gift 
taxation in various combinations), and each possibility in tum should 
be evaluated in combination with all possible forms of other institu-
tions (for example, market economies, feudal systems, and so on). 
But the impossibility of a comprehensive analysis has led to the 
adoption of conventions to make welfarism tractable. One of these is 
that the tax system, and indeed the income tax itself, can be analyzed 
separately from other institutions.190 On this narrower (but still em-
pirically-demanding model), the income tax has two principal effects 
on utility. First, progressive income taxation can increase aggregate 
welfare by redistributing from individuals with low marginal utility of 
money to those with high marginal utility. (This proposition reflects 
the standard convention that individuals have identical preference 
structures and that the marginal utility of money declines as wealth 
increases.) 
Second, however, income taxation can reduce utility by distorting 
relative prices. The background assumption here is that individuals, in 
the absence of taxation, would maximize their welfare by consuming 
according to market prices set in the absence of taxation. If the tax 
system alters the relative prices of, say, work and leisure time, the new 
189 See Kaplow, note 20, at 53-80. 
190 See id. at 13-21 (noting the use and misuse of incomplete analysis.) 
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pricing will lead individuals to alter their perceptions and behavior. 
The new equilibrium will be narrowly optimal (that is, individuals will 
have maximized utility given the existence of the tax). But the total 
utility achieved is, by hypothesis, less than before. 
This trade-off represents the classic dilemma of redistribution, and 
the welfarist ideally would respond by weighing the two effects against 
each other. A large, mathematical literature in economics attempts to 
prescribe an optimal income tax structure by quantifying the magni-
tude of the trade-off under various assumptions.191 
The welfarist prescription for taxation of the family follows the 
same recipe. The income tax should adjust tax liability by taking no-
tice of the family if family relationships either (1) alter the marginal 
utility of money for family members or (2) affect individuals' per-
ceived relative prices of goods or activities. In this standard analysis, 
family relationships potentially affect both. Here I suggest that the 
standard analysis should take note that marriage is no longer a good 
proxy for the activities that a welfarist income tax should aim to 
notice. 
In the remainder of this Section, I begin with the traditional argu-
ments for and against joint filing in a welfarist framework. I then 
show how the de-institutionalization of marriage explodes the old 
trade-offs and requires new policy directions. 
1. The Traditional Debate over Joint Filing 
Begin with the problem of targeting welfarist redistribution. In 
principle, the tax system should redistribute based on the marginal 
utility of money. The ideal would be to take money from individuals 
whose marginal utility is low and redirect it to those whose marginal 
utility is high. But because marginal utility is unobservable, real-
world programs adopt proxies for marginal utility. The convention is 
that taxes should target the rich and transfers should target the poor, 
with "poverty" understood to mean a lack of command over money 
(and other tangible resources that contribute to material well-being). 
(This discussion elides many interesting and important controversies, 
of course, about the proper way to target redistribution in a welfarist 
system, but my aim for the moment is just to convey the standard 
view.) 
Family ties affect wealth and poverty in at least three ways. First, if 
an individual shares resources with another, she may be better or 
191 See J.A. Mirrlees, An Exploration in the Theory of Optimal Income Taxation, 38 
Rev. Econ. Stud. 175 (1971); Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, Optimal Labor Income 
Taxation, in 5 Handbook of Public Economics (Alan Auerbach, Raj Chetty, Martin Feld-
stein & Emmanuel Saez eds., 2013). 
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worse off than she first appears. If Rich shares with Poor, then Rich is 
somewhat less rich than her money income alone makes her seem, 
because she is not consuming all her income herself. But Poor is not 
as poor as he seems, because he has access to Rich's resources as well. 
Family ties may, thus, increase or decrease one's resources and, 
thereby, alter one's marginal utility of money. 
Family adjustments along these lines are common in poverty re-
search and in anti-poverty programs. In 2011, for instance, a two-par-
ent family with $30,000 in income was not considered poor with two 
children but was considered poor with four.192 
Second, families produce economies of scale that improve individu-
als' resource position. Dollars stretch further when the living room, 
fridge, and cars (for example) are shared. Linda, who lives alone on 
$50,000, has fewer resources than Frank, who shares an apartment 
with family (or friends) and earns the same cash income. A redistrib-
utive system should therefore adjust Linda's income downward or 
Frank's upward in order to make judgments about their marginal util-
ity of money. Poverty research and welfare programs typically adjust 
for economies of scale. In 2011, for example, the poverty threshold 
for a four-person family is less than twice the threshold for the two-
person family. 193 
Third, home production and the exchange of nonmarket services for 
consumption goods can also produce extra welfare. A family with a 
homemaker and a large garden is likely better off, in terms of total 
material resources, than a family with similar cash income that lacks 
those productive resources. 
Joint filing has been justified on all three grounds: resource sharing, 
economies of scale, and home production. As Part II recounts, the 
joint return originated as income-splitting, or the equal division of 
marital income between the spouses. Today, the joint return has more 
complicated effects, raising or lowering the tax burden on couples de-
pending on the pattern of their earnings and their position in the rate 
structure. The arbitrariness of marriage bonuses and penalties makes 
it difficult to justify joint filing under current rates as responding in 
any systematic way to the sharing of income in the couple. 
Still, joint filing does, however imperfectly, capture the insight that 
redistribution requires the aggregation of family income in order to 
reflect an individual's true command over resources. While the tax 
burden now assigned to the married compared to the unmarried may 
be arbitrary, the argument runs, joint filing still permits more accurate 
192 See U.S. Census Bureau, Poverty Thresholds (2011), http://www.census.gov/hhes/ 
www/poverty/data/threshld/. 
193 Id. 
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targeting of redistribution. The Rich-Rich couple surely is better off 
than the Rich-Poor couple. And judging Poor's status without regard 
to his marriage to Rich would badly mistarget tax liability and welfare 
payments. 
A similar logic links joint filing to economies of scale and home 
production. Marriage is traditionally an institution for shared living, 
dining, and transportation, and marriage often involves significant 
home production. Joint filing may not be perfectly accurate, the argu-
ment runs, but it is superior to a system that ignores family ties 
altogether. 
Family relationships also potentially affect the welfare cost of redis-
tribution, because family relationships can alter behavioral responses 
to taxation. For instance, family roles and opportunities for home 
production can alter the effective wage schedule that individuals face 
for different activities. For instance, in the married couple, the social 
role of the husband as breadwinner and the wife as homemaker and 
caretaker lead the couple to see the wife as the "secondary" worker-
the worker who will quit her job if the net payoff to the family is 
lacking. 
Herein, of course, lies the conventional critique of joint filing. To 
the extent wives are perceived as secondary workers, the couple eval-
uates the payoff to wives' (but not husbands') work at the couple's 
marginal tax rate.194 When the husband earns more than a small 
amount, the marginal tax rate is higher for the wife than if she were 
unmarried. The high marginal tax rate, in turn, discourages the wife 
from working. The "elasticity" or responsiveness of wives' work to 
taxes is high, probably because the working wife must continue her 
home duties and may experience role conflict (because paid work is 
not valorized so highly for wives as for husbands).195 
Joint filing, then, tends to discourage wives' work, strengthening the 
grip of traditional gender roles against the social forces that have lib-
erated women's choices. Scholars including Grace Ganz Blumberg, 
Pamela Gann, Marjorie Kornhauser, Lawrence Zelenak, Edward Mc-
Caffery and others have pointed out the socially retrograde impact of 
the joint return.196 
194 See Anne L. Alstott, Tax Policy and Feminism: Competing Goals and Institutional 
Choices, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 2001, 2008-14 (1996). 
195 See, e.g., Nada Eissa & Hilary Williamson Haynes, Taxes and the Labor Market 
Participation of Married Couples: The Earned Income Tax Credit, 88 J. Pub. Econ. 1931, 
1951 (2004) (documenting the response of married men's and women's labor supply to 
expansion of the EITC). 
1% See Blumberg, note 23; Gann, note 23; Kornhauser, note 22; Edward McCaffery, 
Slouching Towards Equality: Gender Discrimination, Market Efficiency, and Social 
Change, 103 Yale L.J. 595 (1993); Zelenak, note 17. 
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2. Welfarism and the New Individualism 
But once we recognize how thoroughly the de-institutionalization of 
marriage has altered American family life, the good-enough argu-
ments for joint filing become weak. The key point is that welfarist 
treatment of the family is functionalist: The "family" is the social unit 
that engages in the functions of family life, which might include altru-
ism, role specialization, and nonmarket exchange. The new individu-
alism has distributed these functions well beyond the traditional 
married couple. 
Louis Kaplow, notably, does not make the mistake of equating fam-
ily and formal marriage. Kaplow's analysis of the taxation of the fam-
ily is exceptionally clear, and it illustrates well the disconnect between 
joint filing and welfarist income taxation.197 Kaplow points out that 
families might affect marginal utility or perceived prices in several 
ways. Altruism, for example, can alter the allocation of income and 
consumption goods within the family. Assuming that the altruism is 
genuine and well-informed, the result will be that families are rather 
good vehicles for increasing aggregate utility. For that reason, society 
might subsidize individuals living in families (or, equivalently) tax 
them less than individuals living on their own. Family altruism repre-
sents a form of "redistribution" that need not be expressly mandated 
by the state. As a bonus, altruism serves family preferences and so 
makes everyone feel better off: Parents love seeing their children 
prosper, and so on. For this reason, altruism may multiply utility. 
Still, as Kaplow points out, there is a catch. Altruistic redistribution 
within the family can alter the marginal-utility position of the family 
members.198 Consider Althea and Brenda, who both have zero earn-
ings. Without further information, both would seem to be likely bene-
ficiaries of progressive redistribution, since their marginal utility of 
money is likely very high. But if Althea lives with her parents, while 
Brenda has no relatives, Althea merits less state support. Altruistic 
transfers from her parents have moved her farther along the declin-
ing-marginal-utility-of-money curve than her earnings alone would 
indicate. 
This kind of trade-off, Kaplow notes, makes it complicated to know 
whether, in the end, families of size n should pay n times the tax they 
would pay as individuals, or more or less than that. Kaplow shows 
that the optimal result depends on the shape of the social welfare 
function and other factors. 199 
197 Kaplow, note 189, at 315-43. 
198 Id. at 326. 
199 Id. at 357-406. 
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In addition to altruism, other features of family life may, in princi-
ple, affect the income tax burden on family members compared to 
unrelated individuals. Economies of scale can make the family a rela-
tively efficient generator of utility: Family dollars stretch further 
when the living room, fridge, and cars are shared. But, once again, 
there is a countervailing effect because economies of scale alter the 
marginal utility of money for family members. They may have a lower 
marginal utility of money (because their consumption is higher) than 
comparable unrelated individuals, and so society should tax the family 
more. 
Kaplow's analysis also avoids the shorthand principles that have tra-
ditionally been used to guide the taxation of the family. "Income 
pooling," for example, is an imprecise concept, because it might de-
note altruism, exchange, or economies of scale. Kaplow also does not 
endorse "equivalence scales,"200 which welfare programs and poverty 
measures use to equilibrate the consumption possibilities of families 
of different sizes.201 Instead, Kaplow shows, a full analysis should 
identify with some care the effects of family life on allocation, produc-
tion, and exchange and should (ideally) measure their impact on the 
redistributive upside and deadweight-loss downside of income 
taxation.202 
Kaplow concludes that there is no obvious direction for tax policy a 
priori: Whether society should tax families more heavily or more 
lightly than comparable individuals depends on the content of family 
life (for example, the degree of altruism, the nature of intrafamily ex-
changes, and individual preferences) and the shape of the social wel-
fare function.203 
I have spent some time summarizing Kaplow's work because it illus-
trates that the utilitarian concept of the "family" is functional and va-
riable. The family is defined by its behaviors and attitudes, not its 
formal label, and which groups count as "families" depends on the 
dynamic being examined. If the utilitarian analyst is interested in al-
truism, she should look for social units that engage in altruism. In the 
age of the new individualism, this notion of family will include some 
married couples (but not all) but certainly would also include some 
cohabiting couples, and many parents and adult children. If the ana-
lyst wishes to identify economies of scale, she similarly should look at 
200 See Kaplow, note 189, at 370-87. 
201 James C. Ohls & Harold Beebout, The Food Stamp Program 21-22 (1993) (defining 
the unit as those who pool resources and make joint spending decisions); Patricia Ruggles, 
Drawing the Line: Alternative Poverty Measures and Their Implication for Public Policy 
63-87 (1990). 
202 Kaplow, note 189, at 370-87. 
203 See id. 
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the day-to-day realities of shared living quarters and will count room-
mates and anyone else to the extent they share living quarters and 
durable goods, including cohabiting and married couples, single par-
ents and their children, and so on. Home production has declined in 
the last generation within marriage and now takes place both inside 
and outside marriage to varying degrees. 
The demise of mid-twentieth-century marriage is inconvenient for 
welfarism, because it increases the empirical demands of a welfarist 
analysis. No longer does formal marriage represent a neat package 
containing altruism, home production, economies of scale, and 
nonmarket exchange. Now that family life has migrated outside mar-
riage, and marriage has grown heterogeneous, the utilitarian should 
abandon categories linked to formal marriage and should focus on 
behavior. 
One interesting implication of a welfarist theory is that society may 
properly offer tax subsidies to or impose tax penalties on families. 
But that insight cannot resurrect the welfarist rationale for joint filing 
based on formal marriage. Joint filing is, after all, one (and only one) 
vehicle for imposing tax subsidies or penalties, and from a welfarist 
point of view, it will likely distribute taxes and penalties according to 
the wrong criteria. Subsidies or penalties for altruism, economies of 
scale, or home production, for example, might map poorly onto the 
distributional and behavioral patterns of joint filing based on formal 
marriage. 
A serious welfarist effort to translate theory into tax policy would 
have to tackle the practical difficulties of identifying a range of "fam-
ily" units. The altruistic family, for example, may today be more lineal 
than horizontal, as single parents care for minor children and turn to 
their own parents for support. Shared consumption groups include 
cohabitants and many married couples but also many platonic room-
mates. Role specialization and the prospect of long-term exchange 
now characterize only a fraction of marriages (and a smaller segment 
of cohabitants) and would best be detected by behavior and relative 
earnings, not marital status. 
To be sure, the matter of policy design is, for the welfarist, ulti-
mately an empirical one. We cannot absolutely rule out joint filing 
but only note its implausibility in a probabilistic sense. Just as a rhe-
sus monkey tapping at a computer could in theory produce a great 
American novel, so too might joint filing based on formal marriage 
maximize social welfare compared to subsidies and penalties targeted 
to the family life of twenty-first-century individuals. But a welfarist 
analysis offers no reason to suppose, a priori, that joint filing is opti-
mal. It would be pure coincidence if the right degree of taxation of 
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altruism or economies of scale or home production were captured by 
penalties and bonuses imposed on formally-married people according 
to the accidents of the ·rate structure and the pattern of earnings 
within the couple. 
3. The Challenge of Household Aggregation 
Still, it is worth trying one final lens to capture the welfarist per-
spective. Kaplow's comprehensive approach, while principled and 
clear, roils the policy waters by supporting a range of highly contin-
gent predictions, based on empirical matters unlikely to be measura-
ble. But even if we set aside a complex analysis to return to simpler 
constructs like "pooling," joint filing based on formal marriage no 
longer plausibly serves welfarist ends. 
Pooling received considerable attention in the 1980's and 1990's 
from legal scholars debating joint filing. For instance, Zelenak distin-
guished between pooling as shared control and pooling as shared con-
sumption; he noted that the income tax typically taxes the party who 
has control over income rather than all parties who benefit from it.204 
But, however we choose to interpret "pooling," it is vulnerable to my 
repeated point: In the mid-twentieth century, all these features of 
family life were once closely associated with formal marriage, but to-
day the elision of "marriage" and "family" is no longer tenable. 
Shared consumption occurs in a wide variety of relationships, in-
cluding cohabitants, ordinary roommates, and children (minor or 
adult) living with their parents. Some married couples (long-distance 
couples, commuting couples, and estranged couples) share very little. 
Even in day-to-day life, married couples may not share resources as 
extensively as they once did. As early as 1980, Gann pointed out that 
data do "not generally substantiate the assumption that married per-
sons equally share their income. " 205 In 1996, Marjorie Kornhauser re-
viewed the evidence and conducted an independent study, finding that 
the extent of consumption pooling in marital households is often over-
stated.206 These scholars caught an early glimpse of the new individu-
204 Zelenak, note 17, at 354-55. Gann's 1980 article also discusses pooling and distin-
guishes between the source of income (the earner) and the beneficiaries of it. Gann, note 
23, at 24-25; see also Michael J. Mcintyre, Individual Filing in the Personal Income Tax: 
Prolegomena to Future Discussion, 58 N.C. L. Rev. 469, 469 (1979-1980) (defending joint 
filing on the ground that "[m)any married persons, probably most, pool some or all of their 
individual income sources with their spouses"). 
20s Gann, note 23, at 25-26. 
206 See Kornhauser, note 23, at 1449-50. 
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alism, and new evidence confirms that the trends toward separate 
earnings, spending, and accounting have continued.207 
Similarly, role specialization, nonmarket exchange, and insurance 
also exist outside marriage-and, decreasingly, within it. Cohabiting 
couples often report planning for a joint future. Even though many 
couples break up before that future materializes, the same is true of 
many marriages.208 Many cohabiting couples, and many parents care 
for (minor and adult) children when illness or unemployment strike. 
By contrast, marriages are increasingly heterogeneous in the degree of 
joint planning and insurance they provide. As the divorce rate indi-
cates, many couples do not weather emotional or economic hardship. 
And, as the sociological research shows, individuals find it increasingly 
acceptable to break up when relationships and lives do not meet 
expectations. 
Notions of pooling had intuitive resonance in the era of mid-twenti-
eth-century marriage, when marriage implied a shared social, eco-
nomic, and psychological status. But in the twenty-first century, we 
can no longer assert with much confidence that the married differ 
from the unmarried in their degree of "pooling" or that the married 
resemble one another in that dimension. 
The larger point, then, is that a welfarist income tax can no longer 
rely on formal marriage as an indicator of shared resources, econo-
mies of scale, or household production. Instead, a welfarist income 
tax should take notice of the social units to which individuals belong 
and the terms of those units. 
Phrased that way, the task seems daunting if not impossible. How 
on earth could the income tax take note of the variety of human rela-
tionships, from cohabiting-as-dating to covenant marriage to friends 
with and without benefits? The answer, of course, is that-as we al-
ways do in law-we must adopt some simplified understanding of the 
household. 
Household aggregation is, in fact, already used in transfer programs 
and in some forms of college financial aid. The federal SNAP (food 
stamps) program, for example, defines a household to include "a 
group of individuals who live together and customarily purchase food 
and prepare meals together for home consumption," regardless of re-
201 Charlotte K. Goldberg, The Schemes of Adventuresses: The Abolition and Revival 
of Common-Law Marriages, 13 Wm. & Mary J. Women & L. 483, 532 {2007). 
2os See Sara McLanahan & Audrey N. Beck, Parental Relationships in Fragile Families, 
20 Future of Children 17 (2010), available at http://www.futureofchildren.org/publications/ 
journals/article/index.xml?journalid=73&articleid=529 {documenting "high hopes" among 
unmarried couples at the birth of a child but also the dissolution of cohabiting relationships 
among this economically disadvantaged urban sample). 
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lationships.209 Yale Law School's COAP program requires repayment 
based on "household" income, with no distinction drawn between 
"spouses" and "partners. "210 
Still, formal marriage remains significant in some transfer and fi-
nancial aid provisions. The SNAP statute does recognize formally-
married couples in some regards, treating them as a household even if 
they do not meet the joint-food-preparation standard.211 Federal stu-
dent loans look to the formal marital status of students and their par-
ents when determining how to aggregate "family" income.212 
The practical tasks involved in monitoring the household, once de-
fined, range from relatively easy to devilishly hard. Conceptually, 
there are two problems of administration. The first is verifying the 
existence of household members. Before 1986, the IRS did not re-
quire Taxpayer Identification Numbers for dependents, and taxpayers 
fabricated several million children, who "disappeared" from the sys-
tem when TINs were required.213 Requiring TINs for all household 
members claimed on a return represents a relatively easy extension of 
that approach. 
The second task, monitoring household composition, is quite diffi-
cult, at least at present, because the IRS has very little information 
about living arrangements.214 (Indeed, the IRS today does not rou-
tinely verify even marital status, which is tracked only in local vital 
statistics offices.) The IRS, of course, could gather more information. 
Self-reporting could provide an initial screen. Taxpayers could be 
asked whether they share their living quarters with other adults or 
children, for instance. But auditing such claims would be difficult. 
The administrative dynamics of the system would depend critically 
on whether additional household members would increase or decrease 
tax liability. If extra household members reduced tax liability (via in-
come-splitting), then taxpayers would be likely to exaggerate the ex-
tent of cohabitation. The IRS could require documentary evidence 
(signed leases or joint deeds, for instance), and it might require infor-
mation reporting by landlords and land registries. 
209 7. U.S.C. § 2012(n)(l){B). 
210 See Yale Law School, Career Options Assistance Program, {Apr. 28, 2013, 8:04 PM) 
http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/Financial_Aid/COAP _incoming_description.pdf. 
211 7 U.S.C. § 2012(n). 
212 See U.S. Education Dep't, Filling Out the FAFSA {Apr. 28, 2013, 7:54PM), http:// 
studentaid.ed.gov/fafsa/filling-out/dependency. 
213 L.A. Times, The IRS' Case of Missing Children, Dec. 11 1989, available at articles.la 
times.com/1989-12-l 1/local/me_33 _l_exemptions. 
214 For a review of the evidentiary requirements for documenting "family" in a different 
sense in the Code, see Anthony C. Infanti, Inequitable Administration: Documenting 
Family for Tax Purposes, 22 Colum. J. Gender & L. 329, 334 {2011). 
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If additional household members increased tax liability (because 
the system imposed a "household penalty") then the dynamics would 
shift: People would claim to live apart when in fact they lived to-
gether. Documentary evidence and landlord/land registry reporting 
might assist the IRS, but not all co-habitants appear on the lease or 
title. Very wealthy households might maintain cheap apartments as 
tax-reduction devices-so that a high-earner could plausibly claim to 
live separately. 
A more comprehensive, if creepier, solution, already exists in the 
marketplace. Consumer companies collect a wealth of data on 
purchasing habits, financial status, and internet use.215 These data 
might be shared with the IRS, with the result that the Service could 
monitor household composition. 
The Big Brother aspect of household monitoring may rouse our lib-
eral instincts: It's none of the government's business who lives in my 
house! But the status of privacy objections in welfarist systems is un-
certain. Perhaps privacy is simply one value to be traded off against 
accuracy in a total-welfare calculus. A variety of compromises are 
possible: For instance, perhaps only marriages and cohabiting rela-
tionships that last more than two years would be subject to reporting. 
Perhaps the same time limit might apply before an adult child living 
with her parents is aggregated. And so on. 
Household monitoring is already underway in the Code, where the 
EITC and child credit require the IRS to verify children's residency. 
The administration of these provisions tends to burden lower-income 
people, and these provisions have engendered litigation. If the IRS 
were to adopt rules and procedures for verifying household composi-
tion, the new regime might bring some order and predictability to ex-
isting provisions. Information reporting might also be useful for 
welfare programs, SNAP, and financial aid, creating a wider constitu-
ency for predictable rules-and a political constituency for dignified 
administration with privacy safeguards. 
(Personally, of course, I find all this outlandish; my own preference 
would be for individual filing on liberal grounds. But welfarism may 
imply some sacrifice of personal privacy for the sake of accurate as-
sessment of well-being, and so I aim to take the ideal seriously.) 
As a final point, we should bear in mind the reformulated trilemma: 
One major and unavoidable drawback of household income aggrega-
tion is that it would extend to a broader array of couples the gender 
biases critics have identified in joint filing for married couples. It is 
unclear how significant these biases would be for behavior, but the 
21s Natasha Singer, Consumer Data, But Not for Consumers, N.Y. Times, July 21, 2012, 
at BU3. 
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trilemma suggests that welfarists should consider possible effects on 
the employment of cohabiting women and adult children living at 
home with parents. 
D. Social Conservatism and Incentives for Marriage 
Social conservatives have taken notice of the new individualism, 
and they dislike it. Charles Murray, for instance, notes that many as-
pects of family life now take place outside formal marriage, and he 
equates the change with social breakdown-"coming apart."216 Ana-
lysts far less conservative than Murray also worry about the decline in 
marriage. Many centrist economists, for example, have expressed the 
concern that single parenthood worsens family and child poverty.217 
Taking this perspective, the tax system becomes an instrument for 
resisting and reversing social change: What might the tax system do to 
bolster marriage as an institution, encourage child-bearing and child-
rearing within marriage, and discourage divorce? Social conservatives 
might differ on the proper agenda, and there are a number of conten-
tious questions that should be answered. For instance, studies indicate 
that parental marriage improves outcomes for children, but only when 
the child is the biological child of both parents. Children's outcomes 
in step-families are no better than those in single-parent house-
holds.218 Should this evidence modify the pro-marriage agenda? 
Should the message be to marry, no matter what, or to marry only if 
your spouse is also the parent of your children? 
But, for present purposes, abstract from these questions and sup-
pose that the agenda is simply to encourage Americans, as much as 
possible, to re-create marriage as the institution it once was, with early 
marriage, lasting marriage, early child-bearing, and possibly even 
traditional gender roles. (This agenda is very much not my own, but it 
is interesting to think about, in any event, and certainly is widely pro-
fessed in Washington.) What kind of tax policy would make the most 
sense? 
Begin with the easy conclusion: Joint filing is an exceptionally poor 
tool for encouraging people to marry and stay married. After all, joint 
filing does not necessarily favor marriage. Its penalties and bonuses 
are a complex function of rate brackets and the division of income in 
216 Murray, note 15, at 240-42. 
211 See Isabel V. Sawhill & Ron Haskins, Work and Marriage: The Way to End Poverty 
and Welfare (Brookings Inst., Policy Brief No. 28, 2003), available at http://www.brookings 
.edu/research/papers/2003/09/childrenfamilies-haskins. 
21s Donna K. Ginther & Robert A. Pollack, Family Structure and Children's Educa-
tional Outcomes: Blended Families, Stylized Facts, and Descriptive Regressions, 41 De-
mography 671, 671-72 (2004). 
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the couple. Some couples face marriage penalties, including couples 
in the EITC income range who, at different times, have faced enor-
mous marriage penalties.219 Even a couple with excruciatingly tradi-
tional gender roles could face a marriage penalty if the wife has 
substantial property income. And the marriage bonus is equally arbi-
trary. A nontraditional couple can obtain a marriage bonus if their 
incomes are disparate and fall in the proper range. Imagine a couple 
in their forties, each marrying for the third time, and both working full 
time (one as a freelance writer and one as a lawyer). 
A better policy agenda, from the social conservative perspective, 
would track more closely .the desired behavior. If, for instance, the 
aim is to encourage early marriage, the tax system might offer a re-
fundable credit keyed to the parties' ages (no credit for those over-
thirty yuppie marriages!). If the agenda is to subsidize stay-at-home 
mothers, the tax credit might go to married couples with children and 
one nonworking parent who attests that she cares for the children on a 
daily basis. Tax penalties could target divorce: Perhaps alimony 
should be made nondeductible or property settlements should attract 
an excise tax. 
All of these policies, of course, would take notice of formal mar-
riage in some way, but they would not make use of joint filing. These 
ideas raise administrative issues, to be sure. The IRS might wish to 
verify formal marriage, the parties' ages, division of labor, and so on. 
But, my point made, I will leave it to others to tackle the task of filling 
out a social conservative tax agenda for supporting the family. In-
stead, I want to look beyond joint filing and consider some further 
implications of the new individualism for the income tax and the wel-
fare state. 
v. UPDATING THE WELFARE STATE: TAXING MARRIAGE 
AND THE CASE OF SOCIAL SECURITY 
Having laid joint filing to rest, intellectually at least, one can begin 
to glimpse the new policy possibilities opened up by the new individu-
alism. In this Part, I consider two: an explicit tax on marriage (em-
phatically not a marriage penalty of the existing type) and possible 
reforms of Social Security intended to address the obsolescence of the 
spousal benefit and the rise of new gender inequalities in wages and 
care work. These options do not, by any means, exhaust potential and 
useful reforms in the welfare state, but they do illustrate new ways of 
thinking about family ties and social policy. 
219 Brown, note 47, at 789. 
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A. Marriage, Endowment, and Privi"lege 
The new individualism suggests a marriage tax grounded in two 
very different ideals of taxation. The first is liberalism, which aims to 
tax unearned good luck and cushion unearned bad luck. Ronald 
Dworkin and Philippe Van Parijs, for instance, justify the income tax 
itself on just these grounds.220 But there are other modes of luck that 
fall outside the financial realm. Being married, for example, might 
represent brute luck: Perhaps the ability to attract a spouse reflects 
one's physical attractiveness, intelligence, and personality traits like 
loyalty and sensitivity. In that case, being married or unmarried might 
properly increase or decrease one's tax payment to the state. 
Indeed, Van Parijs explicitly considers a tax on marriage by analogy 
to an income tax.221 He argues that an income tax properly taxes the 
rents, or excess returns, to jobs and to property holdings. He suggests 
that, in principle, marriages might be subject to taxation on similar 
grounds. The married have an opportunity or asset (a spouse) that 
others might wish to have.222 Van Parijs ultimately rejects a marriage 
tax as impractical and intrusive, but the analogy illustrates the liberal 
search for indicators of (unearned) social privilege that the state might 
tax. 
But Van Parijs' analysis, written in the mid-1990's, predates (or co-
incides with) recent trends. In light of the close link between marriage 
and class today, the liberal case for taxing marriage is probably 
stronger. Lasting marriage is, today, a marker of class privilege, a re-
source available differentially to the rich. 
This remains, of course, a controversial claim. The more we see 
marriage as a payoff to choice, the less appealing a liberal marriage 
tax should be. When we talk about how hard married couples have to 
work to preserve their relationship, we are attributing the marriage to 
choice, and the liberal case for taxing it seems weaker. But the more 
we see marriage as a marker or" unearned social privilege, the stronger 
is the liberal case for taxing it. The close link between social class and 
lasting marriage seems to bolster this side of the argument. 
Put another way, the ambiguity of causation223 poses problems for 
the liberal. If it is simply the case that the same people who choose to 
work hard and to achieve market success are also those most willing 
to work hard to hold marriages together, then a marriage tax would 
unfairly tax desert. But if money and privilege can indeed buy love, or 
220 See Dworkin, note 169, at 128; Van Parijs, note 21, at 104. 
221 See Van Parijs, note 21, at 130. 
222 See id. 
223 See Section IIl.C. 
Imaged with the permission of Tax Law Review of New York University School of Law 
2013] UPDATING THE WELFARE STATE 751 
at least modes of life that permit love to flourish, then marriage-as-
privilege seems sensible. 
A welfarist should also find a marriage tax worth further thought. 
Recall that the ideal tax, from a welfarist perspective, would accom-
plish progressive redistribution without any distortion at all. An en-
dowment tax-sometimes called an ability tax-tantalizingly holds 
out just that possibility. 
An endowment tax would impose a fixed tax on each individual 
based on her capacity to earn income-her abilities-and not her ac-
tual income.224 For the welfarist, the difficulties with endowment tax-
ation are mostly practical, and they are thought to be insurmountable. 
We cannot observe people's abilities, and once we start to use particu-
lar activities as an indicator of ability (college education, actual high 
income), then the tax system distorts the prices of those activities. 
Thus, the first-best endowment tax collapses into the second-best in-
come tax, which probably has distortionary effects on labor and 
leisure. 
The link between class and marriage suggests that the state might 
improve the targeting of taxation to ability by tagging marriage-es-
pecially long-lasting marriage-as a trigger for higher taxation inde-
pendent of actual income. Thus, Chris, married for twenty years with 
two children with her husband, would pay a higher (fixed) tax than the 
unmarried Dana, even if Chris and Dana have the same money 
income. 
A tax on marriage is not, of course, a perfect endowment tax. Most 
obviously, it conditions higher taxes on behavior-marriage-and so 
could reduce welfare by distorting marriage decisions. Instead, the 
marriage tax is a variant on what George Akerlof terms "tagging" -
the strategy of directing taxes or welfare payments at some character-
istic that correlates with what the system really wishes to tax (or 
support).225 
The key question, on the welfarist view, is empirical. An income 
tax that raises and redistributes $X would reduce social welfare by 
distorting labor and leisure decisions in some amount (call it L ). A 
tax on enduring marriages that would redistribute the same amount 
would reduce social welfare by M, the distortion in marital decisions. 
Logically, the welfarist should choose the mix of income and marriage 
taxes that produces the highest total utility. 
224 See Han Benshalom & Kendre Stead, Values and {Market) Valuations: A Critique of 
the Endowment Tax Consensus, 104 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1511, 1514-15 (2010). 
225 George A. Akerlof, The Economics of "Tagging" as Applied to the Optimal Income 
Tax, Welfare Programs, and Manpower Planning, 68 Am. Econ. Rev. 8, 8 (1978). 
Imaged with the permission of Tax Law Review of New York University School of Law 
752 TAX LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66: 
How costly are distortions in marital behavior? Some older studies 
suggest that marriage penalties in the income tax have a small but 
noticeable effect on the probability of marriage.226 The rise of the 
new individualism might suggest that marriage has become more elas-
tic-more optional in a social sense. Even so, marriage seems to re-
tain value as a marker of social status, particularly for the well-off.227 
Turning a marriage tax from concept into reality would be challeng-
ing, of course. How long is a "long" marriage? Should the tax kick in 
only after a certain number of years, or should it be graduated? Are 
there other tags that could better tailor the tax to ability or social priv-
ilege? A marriage tax also would have to confront the realities of 
twenty-first-century family life. Why not tax successful cohabitation? 
How about a tax on high-performing children-or children who are 
self-supporting by age 25? And it is difficult, to put it mildly, to imag-
ine U.S. politicians signing on to tax marriage. 
There are also countervailing normative considerations. As I 
noted,228 social science has been unable to determine whether mar-
riage reflects economic privilege-or causes it. If the latter, then tax-
ing marriage would amount to a tax on opportunity, making it more 
costly for individuals to gain access to an institution that can help 
them climb the social and economic ladder. 
In light of these empirical and administrative barriers, my purpose 
in proposing a marriage tax is intellectual rather than practical. In-
deed, I hope that the controversial idea of taxing marriage will prompt 
broader attention to the ways that the new individualism has changed 
our society. The values of equality and well-being that animate liber-
alism and welfarism should move us to examine current social ar-
rangements and ask whether they fairly distribute opportunities for 
family life. 
B. Gender Inequality and Social Security 
There is a fine literature on gender and Social Security, but much of 
it predates the recent acceleration of the new individualism, and much 
of it treats the situation of married (or formerly-married) women as 
the critical social problem that ought to animate U.S. social insurance. 
226 See James Alm & Leslie Whittington, For Love or Money? The Impact of Income 
Taxes on Marriage, 66 Economica 297, 299 (1999); James Alm & Leslie Whittington, 'Ti! 
Death or Taxes Do Us Part, 32 J. Hum. Res. 388 (1997)(finding small effects of tax incen-
tives on divorce decisions). 
221 See Vicki Schultz & Michael Yarbrough, Will Marriage Make Gay and Lesbian 
Couples Less Egalitarian? A Cautionary Tale (unpublished manuscript on file with the 
author) (reviewing sociological evidence on the value of marriage and developing a social 
status model of marriage and gender). 
22s See Section III.C. 
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In this brief discussion, I reconsider the spousal benefit in order to 
illustrate how we might begin to think about gender equality and So-
cial Security in light of the new individualism. 
As noted, the spousal benefit in Social Security reflects the terms of 
mid-twentieth-century marriage. The system awards benefits based 
on formal marriage, and it takes as its model the breadwinner-house-
wife division of labor. Recall that the breadwinner receives a benefit 
based on his (long) work history, while the homemaker receives a 
benefit (half as large) based on marriage. Together, the traditional 
couple receives a retirement benefit equal to 150% of the benefit the 
breadwinner would collect were he single. 
The current structure offers substantial benefits to women, who re-
present 55% of adult OASDI recipients, and who receive 49% of ben-
efits but pay only 41 % of taxes.229 Because women earn (on average) 
less than men, they benefit from the progressive benefits formula, 
which awards higher benefits relative to wages to lower earners. Wo-
men's longer lives also garner greater benefits, because Social Security 
incorporates a life annuity.230 And the spousal benefit provides a 
floor on benefits for married women (or women divorced after ten 
years of marriage or more), while also "topping up" benefits for wives 
earning significantly less than their husbands.231 
But the spousal benefit has a darker side. As critics began to point 
out in the 1970's and 1980's, the spousal benefit combines with the 
payroll tax to disadvantage working wives, who pay full payroll taxes 
but, given their low wages, often receive zero payoff over the spousal 
benefit. 232 
As traditionally understood, then, Social Security faces a policy di-
lemma: The program can only protect economically-vulnerable wives 
if it sacrifices gender equity for working wives. Repealing the spousal 
benefit would remove the penalty on working wives, who would then 
claim the full benefit of their incremental payroll taxes. But doing so 
would leave many wives worse off, in terms of the total benefit re-
ceived. Worst off would be homemakers and homemaker-breadwin-
ner couples. 
But this policy dilemma, much like the trilemma in the income tax, 
is outdated. Traditional wives are increasingly rare, and working 
wives are the new norm. Figure 12 shows the clear trends. 
229 Nat'! Acad. of Soc. Ins., Women's Stake in Social Security (Apr. 28, 2013, 6:34 
PM), http://www.nasi.org/learn/socialsecurity/womens-stake. 
230 U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin., note 57. 
231 See id. 
232 See David L. Kirp, Mark G. Yudoff & Marlene S. Frank, 76 Calif. L. Rev. 1377, 1382 
(1986). 
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FIGURE 12233 
Percentage of Women, Aged 62 and Over, Claiming Social 
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The percentage of women claiming benefits solely as workers (that 
is, with no marital claim) is now nearly 50%.234 The percentage of 
elderly women claiming Social Security only as wives has plummeted 
since 1960, from about a third to less than 10%.235 As of 2011, only 
three million of thirty-six million retirees claim Social Security as 
wives and husbands rather than as retired workers.236 
Projections indicate that these trends will continue. By 2080, only a 
small fraction of female Social Security recipients will claim solely as 
wives. The great majority will claim as workers only, while a signifi-
cant (but, over the 2025-2080 period, declining) percentage will claim 
as dually-entitled (that is, on the basis on their own earnings record, 
"topped up" for the spousal benefit).237 
The demise of mid-twentieth-century marriage has left Social Secur-
ity ill-suited to address the needs of the vulnerable. Care work re-
mains gendered, and it remains a source of economic disadvantage, 
but single mothers, more than wives, are the new face of distress. The 
spousal benefit is available to women married ten years or more, but 
many marriages do not last that long. Further, the never-married re-
233 U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin., note 54, at tbl.5A.14. 
234 See Nat'! Acad. of Soc. Ins., note 229. 
235 See id. 
236 U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin., note 54, tbl.5Cl (data for 2011). 
237 U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin., Women and Dual Entitlement, 2025-2080 (Apr. 28, 2013), 
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/retirementpolicy/projections/women-dual-2025.html; see Fig-
ure 1, at text accompanying note 69. 
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present a vulnerable-and growing-group. Single mothers occupy 
an expanding demographic and are especially hard-pressed by the 
combination of work (often at low wages) and care responsibilities. 
The new individualism has altered the shape of gender inequality 
and economic vulnerability. In the mid-twentieth century, almost all 
women were wives and almost all men were husbands, and both 
groups mostly occupied prescribed roles. In that world, gender ine-
quality burdened wives and benefitted husbands, and abandoned 
wives and widows were the object of great (and deserved) social con-
cern. Today, by contrast, the new individualism situates gender ine-
quality elsewhere. Women continue to earn lower wages than men, 
due in part to discriminatory employment structures. Mothers earn 
lower wages than childless women, due to the structure of child care. 
Single mothers often live in poverty, due to low wages, child care re-
sponsibilities, and the absence of financial and hands-on support from 
absent fathers. 
In this new world, the spousal benefit has more than a whiff of 
"Mad Men" about it: It is a set piece from another time. So, too, do 
familiar reforms seem outdated. For instance, some have proposed 
repealing the spousal benefit in order to increase the survivor's bene-
fit, which would primarily assist widows.238 That kind of reform might 
be appropriate as a transitional matter, because many of today's eld-
erly women came of age during the era of mid-twentieth-century mar-
riage. But, looking forward, that agenda still focuses on formal 
marriage as a source of economic security and, thus, will become in-
creasingly out of touch with social reality. 
Another familiar reform, discussed seriously in the 1980's and 
1990's, would create Social Security entitlements based on child-rear-
ing responsibilities. Options might include additional drop-out years 
(which increase a worker's benefit) or wage "credit" for child-rear-
ing.239 These proposals might aid middle-class women who have 
stayed at home with children. But, today, the stay-at-home mother is 
no longer the only, or even the major, caretaker who is economically 
vulnerable. Far more numerous are women who work full-time, or 
close to full-time, but at low wages, with little child support and high 
child-care costs. Unless credits for child care benefit those who are 
238 See Urban Inst., Spouse and Survivor Benefits, www.urban.org/retirement_policy/ss 
spousesurvivor.cfm (last visited Aug. 6, 2013). 
239 See Pamela Herd, Crediting Care in Social Security: A Proposal for an Income 
Tested Care Supplement (Jan. 2009), at www.nasi.org/research/2009/crediting-care-social-
security-proposal-income-tested-care; Howard M. Iams & Steven H. Sandell, Changing So-
cial Security Benefits to Reflect Child-Care Years: A Policy Proposal Whose Time Has 
Passed?, 57 Soc. Sec. Bull. 10 (1994). 
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also full-time workers, such proposals would not address the situation 
of many single mothers. 
As we think about true innovation in Social Security, three issues 
(at least) should be pressing. First, the issue of generational transition 
should be in the forefront of our thinking. Today's elderly cohort in-
cludes many people who abided by and relied on the commitments of 
mid-twentieth-century marriage, and their work and social histories 
differ from those of later generations. Phase-outs and other transi-
tional mechanisms will be essential if we are to tailor programs to 
changing social reality. 
Second, the de-institutionalization of marriage invites a deeper re-
thinking of the mission of Social Security (and social insurance more 
generally). As formal marriage wanes in importance as a social cate-
gory, we need new ways of thinking about the life course and the ca-
tastrophes against which the state should insure individuals. What are 
the major events that can leave an individual economically and so-
cially vulnerable today? Divorce, low wages, a childhood in poverty, 
nonmarital births? 
Third, there are policy opportunities as well as pitfalls here. Taking 
the new individualism seriously puts on the policy table some innova-
tions that might have seemed outlandish even twenty years ago. Con-
sider two examples. First, in 1999, Bruce Ackerman and I proposed to 
convert Social Security into a flat old-age benefit, which would pay 
the same benefit to each aged individual, regardless of his or her work 
and marital history.240 In 2011, the U.S. government spent $596 bil-
lion on OASI for 44 million retired workers, spouses, and children.241 
A back-of-the-envelope calculation (ignoring the likelihood that chil-
dren should receive a smaller benefit reflecting economies of scale in 
family life) suggests that, without a tax increase, the system could pay 
a flat benefit of $14,000 annually to every beneficiary. Including indi-
viduals now shut out of Social Security would reduce the benefit 
somewhat.242 A more progressive benefits formula could increase in-
surance to low-paid workers without as thoroughly disrupting the rela-
tionship between wage record and benefit levels. 
A second proposal worth considering is an optional joint-and-survi-
vor annuity. At retirement, each insured worker might be entitled to 
claim either a solo benefit or a lower joint benefit, payable to any 
survivor of her choice. One's beneficiary might be a spouse, a roman-
240 Ackerman & Alstott, note 21, at 130-31. 
241 Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Historical Tables, tbl.11.3, http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
omb/budget/Historicals (last visited Aug. 6, 2013); Soc. Sec. Admin., note 55, tbls.5, AS. 
242 In 2010, there were just forty million Americans age sixty-five and older. Another 
seventeen million were ages sixty to sixty-four. Thus, much would depend on the treat-
ment of early retirement. U.S. Census Bureau, note 28, at 11 tbl.7. 
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tic partner, a sibling, or an adult child. The key is that the survivor 
annuity would not be free: The retiree would receive an actuarially 
fair payout, so that (for instance), an elderly couple would receive a 
different monthly benefit than an elderly woman who wished to pro-
vide for an adult child. The details would require actuarial work but, 
in effect, would permit individuals to decide for themselves how to 
split their Social Security wealth between their own life and the life of 
a loved one. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Depending on one's normative perspective, the new individualism 
may mark a new era of personal freedom or a sign of cultural decay. 
But, whatever one's stance, the new individualism should be inte-
grated into tax policy design. The new shape of American family life 
renders some existing policies obsolete and requires reforms that pose 
new challenges for law and administration. 
Joint filing based on formal marriage is particularly ill-suited to the 
new patterns of marriage and child-rearing. In the mid-twentieth cen-
tury, the prevalence, homogeneity, and exclusivity of formal marriage 
made it a convenient and perfectly sound proxy for family. Today, 
however, joint filing is not a plausible way of attempting to protect 
freedom or promote collective welfare. 
Joint filing represents a poor policy choice even for social conserva-
tives devoted to bolstering formal marriage. Politics-including the 
logjam that blocks redistributing tax burdens in any way-may ex-
plain why joint filing persists. But a serious social conservative should 
reject the arbitrary set of penalties and bonuses in the current system 
in favor of a more deliberate effort to identify and reward socially-
productive behavior. Instead of rewarding some formally-married 
couples-or some married couples with traditional gender roles-why 
not reward them all? Tax incentives for formal marriage could be in-
creased for, say, early marriage or lasting marriage. 
Once we abandon the fiction that joint filing represents a sound (or 
even tenable) approach to taxing the family, new challenges and op-
portunities arise. In this Article, I have outlined four: 
First, individual filing might fit best with liberal commitments but 
would require new policies to curb income-shifting via property trans-
fers. These rules, in turn, could reduce tax avoidance in the family 
beyond the married couple. 
Second, household filing might best accord with welfarist norms but 
would require new rules and technology for defining the household 
and monitoring entry and exits. But a tax system capable of aggregat-
ing income at the household level (even reasonably well) would mark 
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a major advance in the ability to administer the EITC and other tax-
based transfer programs, to which Congress has traditionally at-
tempted to apply expansive, welfare-type measures of economic well-
being. Aggregating income at the household level-across the board 
or only for purposes of certain rules-would provide Congress with a 
new tool for social policy. But the costs include a loss of privacy and 
the extension of the work disincentives now found in joint filing to a 
whole new set of unmarried couples. 
Third, both liberal and welfarist ideals might support the use of 
marriage as a "tag" for class privilege or ability (respectively) in order 
to redistribute income fairly and with less deadweight loss. While a 
marriage tax seems unlikely to be a political centerpiece for either 
party, policymakers could at a minimum remove tax advantages to 
marriage, which-in light of the new individualism-map rather 
closely onto tax advantages for the social elite. 
Finally, the new individualism has implications for the welfare state 
well beyond the income tax. The demise of mid-twentieth-century 
marriage and the changing burden of gender inequality should prompt 
the repeal of the spousal benefit in Social Security and the redesign of 
the system to address the situation of single parents and the diversity 
of modem families. 
We might-and should-go further in examining the implications of 
the new individualism for tax policy and the welfare state. References 
to marriage and family occur frequently throughout the Code, and a 
thorough review would revisit them to ask whether formal marriage 
represents a sound distinction in light of the purposes of the provi-
sion.243 For example, divorced spouses (but not a separating cohab-
iting couple or co-parents who cooperate but live separately) can 
structure property settlement, alimony, and child support in tax ad-
vantageous ways. Attribution rules operate for married couples but 
not cohabiting couples, unmarried co-parents, step-parents, step-chil-
dren or siblings. The diversity of family life may defy generalizations. 
In one family, a parent's unmarried partner is a transient figure, while 
in another, he is closer to the children than their biological father. 
One adult child will include her step-grandmother but not her biologi-
cal mother in her family circle, while another child from another fam-
ily (or even the same family!) may have a very different experience of 
family. 
243 See Theodore P. Seto, The Assumption of Selfishness in the Internal Revenue Code: 
Reframing the Unintended Tax Advantages of Gay Marriage 1-14 (Loyola Law Sch. Legal 
Studies, Paper No. 2005-33, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=850645 ( docu-
menting the many provisions of the Code that mention family life and considering whether 
related-party rules should apply to same-sex spouses). 
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Looking beyond marriage to child-rearing opens up a host of issues. 
Blended families and joint custody, for instance, pose fascinating is-
sues. Today, the tax law permits only one exemption per depen-
dent.244 The logic is that each child requires only so much support 
from someone-an idea that is sound enough when children live with 
their own two parents in a single household. But now consider a child 
who lives half-time with each parent in a separate household: The 
diseconomies of scale (two bedrooms, two sets of clothes, uneaten 
food) make this child's support more costly for the family than the 
two-parent, one-home model recognizes. 
Once we realize that the model of two married and co-resident par-
ents is no longer standard, the issues for the tax system multiply. A 
number of adults may support a child, pay for her health care, contrib-
ute to the cost of college, and so on. While the difficulty of obtaining 
information on family configurations may seem daunting, we should 
not overstate the problem. It may be possible to centralize data from 
vital statistics offices, court records, and school records to document 
family structure. Household aggregation of income would assist in the 
task of documenting co-residence. 
The policy stakes here are high. The federal income tax system ad-
ministers major protectors for family life, including the EITC, the 
child credit, and tuition and health-care subsidies. And, depending on 
one's normative perspective, adjusting income in light of family ties is 
a critical task for any income tax, quite apart from these social policy 
measures. The new individualism, happily or unhappily, requires a 
wholesale revision of the nexus between the tax system and family 
life. 
244 See IRC § 151(b )(1). 
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